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1 
INCITEMENT TO RIOT IN THE AGE OF FLASH MOBS 
Margot E. Kaminski 
“[B]y collective effort individuals can make their views known, when, 
individually, their voices would be faint or lost.”1 
 
 “You know I have always made a study of the psychology, sociology of 
mob reaction.  It is exemplified out there . . . .  Those mobs are chanting; 
that is the caveman’s chant.  They were trained to do it.  They were 
trained this afternoon.  They are being led; there will be violence.”2 
 
“No one would have the hardihood to suggest that the principle of 
freedom of speech sanctions incitement to riot.”3 
 
As people increasingly use social media to organize both protests and 
robberies, government will try to regulate these calls to action.  With an 
eye to this intensifying dynamic, this Article reviews First Amendment 
jurisprudence on incitement and applies it to existing statutes on 
incitement to riot at a common law, state, and federal level.  The article 
suggests that First Amendment jurisprudence has a particularly tortuous 
relationship with regulating speech directed to crowds.  It examines 
current crowd psychology to suggest which crowd behavior, if any, 
should as a matter of policy be subject to regulation.  It concludes that 
many existing incitement-to-riot statutes are both bad policy and 
unconstitutional under Brandenburg v. Ohio.4  The article consequently 
suggests that courts should be careful in the application of these 
statutes, and states should be hesitant to build upon existing incitement-
to-riot statutes to regulate new media. 
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 1. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981). 
 2. Terminiello v. City of Chi., 337 U.S. 1, 21 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Father Terminiello’s speech to the Christian Veterans of America) (emphasis in original). 
 3. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940). 
 4. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past year, social media has spawned both revolutions and 
robberies.5  Governments have consequently tried to create new laws to 
regulate this behavior.6  The law most worth examining, however, is not 
new.  Many states already criminalize incitement to riot, and the federal 
anti-riot statute criminalizes the use of interstate commerce to incite 
riot.7 No survey of these laws or the underlying riot statutes currently 
exists that analyzes them under the First Amendment.8 
This Article reviews existing definitions of riot and incitement to riot 
under common law, state statutes, and federal statutes, and creates a 
taxonomy of the constitutional problems that arise.  It aims to alert 
courts to the problems inherent in existing state and federal statutes, and 
to encourage states to avoid using these statutes as a basis for regulating 
social media.  Existing statutes are particularly ill-suited to dealing with 
how people assemble in the age of the flash mob. 
Incitement-to-riot statutes present a fascinating First Amendment 
problem because they implicate not one, but two protected freedoms: 
freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.  Banning incitement to riot 
is dangerous because if the ban is overbroad, it can restrict not just 
speech, but the means by which people assemble.  Incitement to riot 
differs from the usual fact patterns for freedom of assembly cases in that 
 
 5. See Bill Wasik, Riot: Self-Organized, Hyper-Networked Revolts—Coming to a City Near 
You, WIRED, Dec.16, 2011, http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/12/ff_riots/all/. 
 6. See Jane E. Kirtley, Privacy Protection and Related Developments in Internet Law, in 
COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2011 212–13 (2011). 
 7. See, e.g., Federal Anti-Riot Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 2102 (1996). 
 8. To my knowledge, nobody has examined the substance of state anti-riot laws or incitement-
to-riot laws and how they differ.  A 1985 American Law Report annotation compiled state cases to 
examine what constitutes sufficiently violent conduct to establish the crime of riot in state courts, but 
did not reach other elements of the crime, such as intent or the number of persons involved.  It also did 
not address incitement to riot.  See generally Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, What Constitutes 
Sufficiently Violent, Tumultuous, Forceful, Aggressive, or Terrorizing Conduct to Establish Crime of 
Riot in State Courts, 38 A.L.R.4th 648 (1985). 
3
Kaminski: Incitement to Riot
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013
4 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
the central question revolves around how violent or disorderly a crowd 
may be before it loses First Amendment protection.  Incitement to riot 
thus provides an opportunity for a new discussion of what peaceable 
freedom of assembly means. 
The second half of this Article shifts from a discussion of the 
constitutionality of these statutes to a discussion of crowd behavior and 
the justifications used for regulating crowds.  Government regulation of 
crowds stems from fundamental understandings—and 
misunderstandings—of the nature of crowd activity.  Regulation reveals 
a tension between conflicting understandings of the nature of crowds.  
On the one hand, the crowd can represent the tyranny of the majority 
against a minority; on the other, it can be a way for the powerless to 
protest the powerful.  Governments should not be able to claim that they 
are protecting individuals against the majority when in fact they are 
protecting the status quo against collective action by less powerful 
individuals. 
Thus, the second half of this Article examines both how legislators 
and courts understood crowds in the past and how we understand them 
now.  This Part suggests that we need to reevaluate how crowds are 
regulated.  It examines the role of new media and ask whether it changes 
the calculation.  This Articles closes by proposing a model incitement-
to-riot statute that takes Brandenburg into account and is backed by a 
more current understanding of crowd behavior. 
People assemble for many reasons: for performance, for protest, and 
for communication with their government.  Often, the most effective 
feature of a large gathering is that it visibly demonstrates collective 
power, which sometimes creates fear.  State riot laws that are based on 
regulating the mere creation of fear or “public terror” thus strike at the 
heart of the power of assembly.  They are also likely unconstitutional 
under the First Amendment. 
Now is a particularly opportune time to rethink existing statutes on 
incitement to riot and the underlying offense of riot.  Many existing 
statutes are overbroad and sweep in innocuous activity.  One does not 
have to look at their application to social media to see that these statutes 
are overbroad; however, the use of social media for both democratic 
organization and destructive purposes makes the scope of these statutes 
a more pertinent and pressing issue. 
II. THE RISE OF FLASH MOBS 
In January 2012, both Time Magazine and Wired Magazine celebrated 
the previous year as a year of revolutions started on the internet.  Time’s 
“Person of the Year” was The Protester: from the Arab Spring to 
4
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Athens, from Occupy Wall Street to Moscow.9  Wired published an 
article entitled Riot: How Social Media Fuels Social Unrest.10 
The internet is a strikingly useful tool for organizing or creating 
crowds.  The phenomenon of the “flash mob” emerged in the early 
2000s, when improvisational comedy groups began using public space 
for spontaneous performances by large groups of people brought 
together online.11  Flash mobs occur when a leader calls for a crowd to 
appear at a location, usually to perform some act.  A flash mob has 
several features: the announcer usually does not know the full 
membership of the crowd; the crowd is told the time, place, and, 
sometimes, the purpose of the gathering; and the crowd acts on the 
announcement with no apparent incentive.12 
At first, the flash mob served as comedy or lighthearted social 
commentary, with large groups meeting to dance silently in public areas, 
shop for a love rug, or freeze in place in Grand Central Station.13  But as 
early as 2002, it became apparent that flash mobs could be effectively 
employed for political purposes.  In that context, they have been referred 
to as “smart mobs.”14  Flash mobs have been used for political activism 
in the United States, to stage protests against Russian Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin, and to protest the totalitarian regime in Belarus.15  More 
recently, dissidents employed flash mob tactics during the Arab Spring.  
Thousands of Iranians organized via Twitter in 2009 to protest the 
elections, and more than 50,000 people gathered in Tahrir Square in 
Egypt in 2010.  Many of those who appeared were informed of the 
gatherings through social media tools such as Twitter or Facebook.16 
The same tools that make it easier to organize collective performance 
art or start a revolution, however, have increasingly been used for 
committing group crimes.  In cities across the United States, and more 
 
 9. Kurt Andersen, The Protester, TIME, Dec. 14, 2011, 
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2101745_2102132_2102373,00.html. 
 10. Wasik, supra note 5. 
 11. A comedic performance art group named Improv Everywhere formed in 2001 to carry out 
“missions” in public places, with some involving volunteers who were not a member of the group; 
Improv Everywhere claims that its acts are not flash mobs.  See IMPROV EVERYWHERE, 
http://improveverywhere.com/faq/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2012).  Bill Wasik has often been credited with 
the creation of the term “flash mobs.”  Clay Shirky, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF 
ORGANIZING WITHOUT ORGANIZATIONS 165 (2008); see also Wasik, supra note 5. 
 12. See generally Wasik, supra note 5. 
 13. Shirky, supra note 11, at 165.  For an example of a performance in Grand Central Station by 
the group Improv Everywhere, see Frozen Grand Central, IMPROV EVERYWHERE (Sept. 28, 2012, 3:16 
PM), http://improveverywhere.com/2008/01/31/frozen-grand-central/. 
 14. See HOWARD RHEINGOLD, SMART MOBS: THE NEXT SOCIAL REVOLUTION (2002). 
 15. Shirky, supra note 11, at 166. 
 16. Daniel Tovrov, Flash Mobs: 5 Biggest Flash Mobs of All Time, INT’L BUS. TIMES Aug. 24, 
2011, http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/203118/20110824/flash-mob-biggest-flash-mobs-ever.htm. 
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recently, in the United Kingdom,17 social media have been used to 
organize mobs for the purpose of committing crimes.  These “flash 
robs,” as news media have been describing them, use flash mob tactics 
to overwhelm local police forces and shop owners by announcing a 
potential robbery.  In 2010 and 2011, flash robs were reported in 
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, 
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington, D.C., and Canada.18 
There has been some pushback on the assumption that these events 
were started through social media.  District of Columbia (D.C.) police 
have said that they have no evidence that the group robberies in the D.C. 
area were organized through social media.19  In Ohio, it also appears that 
some of the violence did not begin as a flash mob, though it may have 
been exacerbated by social media once the violence started.20  The 
investigation into one of the Maryland group robberies the media had 
termed a flash rob found that the thieves had hatched their plan on a 
 
 17. See generally Wasik, supra note 5 (discussing the UK riots and their link to social media); 
see also Tovrov, supra note 16 (“Thanks mostly to BBM, the BlackBerry instant messaging service, 
youth all over the country began amassing in commercial centers, breaking into stores and destroying 
everything in their path.  For the first three days, destruction and chaos ruled over police and order.  
People set fire to cars, buses and buildings, and groups of masked kids robbed people in restaurants and 
on the street.  Five people were killed over five days, in incidents that have been deemed murder.”). 
 18. See Ian Urbina, Mobs Are Born as Word Grows by Text Message, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/us/25mobs.html; Miguel Bustillo & Ann Zimmerman, 
‘Flash Robs’ Vex Retailers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203752604576643422390552158.html; Matt Diener, 
Flashmob Flash-Robs Lingerie Store in Washington, D.C., TECHNORATI, July 26, 2011, 
http://technorati.com/technology/article/flashmob-flash-robs-lingerie-store-in/; Brandon Cooper, ‘Flash 
Rob’: Thieves, Like Locusts, Clean Out Store, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 19, 2011, 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/national_world/2011/12/19/flash-rob-thieves-like-locusts-
clean-out-store.html; ‘Flash Mob’ Robs Maryland 7-Eleven in Less Than a Minute, Police Say, CNN, 
Aug. 16, 2011, http://edition.cnn.com/2011/CRIME/08/16/maryland.flash.mob/ [hereinafter CNN]; 
Chicago Flash Mobs: Police Superintendent Vows Crackdown, Rep. Rush Takes Exception, 
HUFFINGTON POST, June 7, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/07/chicago-flash-mobs-
police_n_872730.html; Stan Donaldson, Flash Mobs: Cleveland Heights Fair Violence was Catalyst for 
Crackdown, CLEVELAND.COM, Dec. 19, 2011, 
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2011/12/flash_mobs_cleveland_heights_f.html; ‘Flash Mobs’ on the 
Rise, NACS ONLINE, May 9, 2011, 
http://www.nacsonline.com/NACS/News/Daily/Pages/ND0509113.aspx; Debra Black, ‘Flash Robs’ 
Invade Canada, THESTAR.COM, Aug. 5, 2011, http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/1034739--
flash-robs-invade-canada?bn=1; Thieves Use Facebook and Twitter to Co-ordinate ‘Flashrob’ Raid of 
Victoria’s Secret Store, DAILY MAIL, July 26, 2011, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2018835/Facebook-Twitter-used-plan-flashrob-raid-Victorias-Secret-store.html. 
 19. Cooper, supra note 18 (“D.C. police, who also have had to deal with some thefts labeled as 
flash-mob robberies, said they have no evidence that social media was used in any recent group crimes, 
spokeswoman Gwendolyn Crump said.”). 
 20. Donaldson, supra note 18 (“But what happened in Cleveland Heights in June does not fit the 
popular definition of a flash mob, The Plain Dealer has learned.  Unlike in other cities, no general call to 
gather appears to have spread on Facebook or Twitter . . . And it’s not to say that social media played no 
role in what happened.  When the violence began, police have found, teens were buzzing about it in real 
time via Twitter and Facebook, rapidly spreading word of the disturbance and likely exacerbating it.”). 
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bus.21 
After a year of flash mob-associated violence, the term flash mob has 
taken on a different meaning.  “Mob” is no longer a tongue-in-cheek 
designation.22 It has now taken on the connotations of its original 
definition: “a large or disorderly crowd; especially: one bent on riotous 
or destructive action.”23 
Some governments have taken action by targeting the resulting 
physical assembly.  Philadelphia, for example, has imposed a 9:00 p.m. 
curfew on young people to prevent large late-night gatherings.24  In New 
Jersey, flash mob participants have been charged with disorderly 
conduct or the obstruction of public passages.25  In March 2012, 
Virginia state police arrested thirty-one protestors out of a group of 1000 
people who showed up at the state capitol to protest a bill that would 
require women to have an ultrasound before having an abortion.26  The 
protestors were not violent; the police claimed they were called in 
because the group was “getting really large and we didn’t want things to 
get out of hand.”27 
Other governments have monitored, shut down, or regulated social 
media instead of or in addition to regulating the resulting physical 
assembly.28  In northwest England, two men were jailed for inciting riot 
after the London violence and robberies in the summer of 2011.29  In 
San Francisco, cell phone and mobile internet service were blocked in 
the public transportation system, the BART, to prevent protests.30  In 
Philadelphia, the FBI monitors social-networking sites for flash mob 
activity.31  Many towns have set up task forces to address flash mobs.32 
At least one government has recognized that there are already existing 
statutes addressing both aspects of flash mob behavior: riot and 
incitement to riot.  In 2011, Cleveland City Council Members proposed 
an emergency ordinance, Section 605.091, “prohibiting the improper use 
 
 21. Wasik, supra note 5. 
 22. See id. 
 23. MERRIAM–WEBSTER DICTIONARY (1981). 
 24. See Urbina, supra note 18. 
 25. Kirtley, supra note 6, at 212. 
 26. Cassie Murdoch, Things Get Ugly in Virginia as Riot Police Crack Down on Pro-Choice 
Protesters, JEZEBEL,Mar. 5 2012, http://jezebel.com/5890406/things-get-ugly-in-virginia-as-riot-police-
crack-down-on-pro-choice-protesters. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Kirtley, supra note 6, at 212–13. 
 29. CNN, supra note 18. 
 30. Alexia Tsotsis, BART Shuts Down Cell Service to Thwart Rumored Protests, Gets Actual 
Protests (and Has to Close Stations), TC, Aug. 15, 2011, http://techcrunch.com/2011/08/15/bart-shuts-
down-cell-service-to-thwart-rumored-protests-gets-actual-protests/. 
 31. Urbina, supra note 18. 
 32. Kirtley, supra note 6, at 212. 
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of social media to induce persons to commit a criminal offense.”  The 
ACLU protested, and the Cleveland mayor vetoed the initial proposed 
ordinance.33  In December 2011, however, Cleveland adopted a revised 
version of the ordinance that lists “electronic media devices” as criminal 
tools used to incite riots.34  The mayor did not sign the revised 
ordinance, because he claimed the provisions “mirror state laws already 
in place.”35  The new Section 605.011 bans incitement to riot, and adds 
computers and cellular telephones to a list of items that can be 
considered criminal tools when used illegally.36 
The back-and-forth over the Cleveland ordinance is a window onto 
how existing incitement-to-riot laws might be used to target the 
organizers of flash mobs.  A state or municipality with existing riot 
statutes and incitement-to-riot statutes might assume, like Cleveland, 
that it can sweep social media into the existing offense. 
The problem is that many existing incitement-to-riot statutes are 
likely unconstitutional.  However, they have either not been aired before 
courts or have been misread. 
III. HYPOTHETICALS 
Before reviewing existing statutes, it is worth getting a sense of what 
is at stake if the law sweeps too broadly.  It may seem entirely 
reasonable to have a law against inciting a riot.  The Supreme Court 
itself said in dicta that “[n]o one would have the hardihood to suggest 
that the principle of freedom of speech sanctions incitement to 
riot . . . .”37  But that comment depends on a limited understanding of 
incitement, and a limited understanding of riot.  If “riot” is defined 
broadly—which it often is—and “incitement” is not defined at all—
which it often is not—then incitement to riot can sweep in innocuous or 
even socially beneficial activity. 
If a person tweets, “Let’s meet all 70 of us in Times Square in 5 
minutes to rob a bank,” it is reasonable for a government to desire to 
punish that speech.  If the tweet happens, and the robbery in fact occurs, 
the tweet could be evidence of a number of things: direct participation in 
the robbery, aiding and abetting the robbery, or conspiracy to commit 
the robbery.  In fact, there is no real need to go after the speaker for a 
 
 33. Pat Galbincea, Flash Mob Ordinances Become Law in Cleveland Minus Mayor Frank 
Jackson’s Signature, CLEVELAND.COM, Dec. 12, 2011, 
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2011/12/flash_mob_ordinances_become_la.html. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Thomas Ott, Cleveland Again Targets Social Media Role in ‘Flash Mobs’, CLEVELAND.COM, 
Dec. 6, 2011, http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2011/12/cleveland_again_targets_social.html. 
 37. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940). 
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crime of incitement to robbery or incitement to riot, because the 
speaker’s involvement in the robbery could be punished through other 
means.  But the author of the tweet could also constitutionally be 
punished for incitement to riot if the tweet calls for a large number of 
people to gather together to commit an unlawful act of force or violence, 
is likely to be understood as calling for riot, and that riot is imminent 
and likely to occur.38 
If, by contrast, a person tweets only “meet in Times Square next 
month,” things become more complicated.  First, there is no underlying 
crime contemplated on the face of the message.  Second, because there 
is no number of people mentioned, it is not clear that the speaker intends 
a large group to form.  Third, there is no indication that the speaker 
himself will be present.  Fourth, the time frame mentioned—“next 
month”—gives adequate time to police to prepare for responding to the 
gathering, so regulating the tweet itself is less justified and probably 
unconstitutional. 
Let us imagine that the speaker just wants to convene a small meeting 
between friends, but in fact the tweet goes viral, a group of seventy 
people convenes in response to it, and a riot begins.  A vague 
incitement-to-riot statute could sweep into its purview the speaker who 
does not intend for a riot to occur.  It risks using the benefit of hindsight 
to create after-the-fact penalties for innocent speech. 
An incitement-to-riot law based on a broad definition of riot creates a 
different problem.  If a person tweets: “Larry and Curly, let’s meet in 
Times Square in 5 minutes and get rowdy,” they might be liable under 
existing incitement-to-riot statutes.  This is because many states 
criminalize gatherings of as few as two or three people under their riot 
statutes.  Calling for more than two people to show up somewhere and 
in some way disturb the public peace, then, could constitute a crime 
under an incitement-to-riot statute that defines riot too broadly. 
The way to prevent such over-expansive enforcement is to more 
carefully define both riot and incitement to riot.  When most of us think 
of “riot,” we think of large crowds that cause damage, like the UK riots 
of 2011.  But the statutory and common-law definitions of riot often 
include surprisingly small gatherings that do not cause physical damage 
at all.  Supreme Court doctrine controls the definition of incitement, 
requiring intent, and that the lawless acts be both imminent and likely to 
occur.  Many incitement-to-riot statutory schemes do not require intent, 
imminence, or likelihood of riot. 
 
 38. See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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IV. THE STATUTES 
Nearly all states have statutes addressing riot, and many have statutes 
on inciting riot.  There are two steps involved in examining an 
incitement-to-riot statute.  First, we can look at how the statute defines 
“incitement.”  This entails examining whether the statute includes any 
language on the imminence of the riot, or the likelihood that the riot will 
occur.  The required intent is important, too.  This examination gives 
rise to a more traditional Brandenburg analysis that considers whether 
the incitement portion of the statute by itself maps onto current First 
Amendment doctrine on incitement.  This is where most courts have 
found problems with existing incitement-to-riot laws, if they have found 
problems at all. 
Second, incitement-to-riot statutes are based on the underlying crime 
of riot.  The underlying definition of “riot” in a number of states is likely 
unconstitutional because it violates freedom of assembly.  A law that 
bans large assemblies that are physically harmful or destructive is likely 
constitutional.  Many state riot laws, however, do not define “riot” in 
this way.  In fact, many state riot statutes ban surprisingly small 
assemblies that do no more than create public fear, rather than cause 
physical harm. 
Before applying First Amendment jurisprudence, this Part reviews 
and categorizes existing laws on both incitement to riot and the 
underlying crime of riot. 
A. Incitement to Riot 
Incitement to riot is a statutory crime in many states, as well as under 
federal law.39 Some states have common-law incitement to riot, rather 
than a statute.40 There is no Model Penal Code section on incitement to 
riot, so the variation between states is fairly broad. 
There are roughly five kinds of incitement-to-riot statutes, with 
additional variations within the five categories.  The most basic kind of 
incitement-to-riot statute simply criminalizes committing an act “that 
urges other persons to riot.”41  South Carolina criminalizes “instigating, 
 
 39. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6201(b) (2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329.2 (2011); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-104(1) (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.2 (2011).  See also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2101 (2006). 
 40. See generally State v. Beasley, 317 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1975); Commonwealth v. Hayes, 209 
A.2d 38 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1965). 
 41. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-104(1) (2009).  Montana’s statute also explains that the 
act “may not include the mere oral or written advocacy of ideas or expression of belief that does not 
urge the commission of an act of immediate violence.” 
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promoting, or aiding [a riot],”42 and New York makes it a crime when a 
person “urges” other people to commit the statutory definition of 
“riot.”43  I group these statutes together because they do not on their 
faces define incitement or an equivalent term.44   
A second, directly related incitement statute is the Federal Anti-Riot 
Act.  The Federal Anti-Riot Act, enacted in 1968, bans interstate travel 
or the use of interstate commerce, including the mail, with intent to 
incite a riot and an overt act done for that purpose.45  Like the first type 
of statute discussed above, the Federal Anti-Riot Act does not define 
incitement.  But it differs from statutes that simply criminalize inciting 
to riot, because it requires the use of interstate commerce.  Courts have 
addressed the Federal Anti-Riot Act in varying ways, and for the most 
part have upheld its constitutionality; I discuss these further below. 
A third type of incitement-to-riot statute defines incitement on its face 
as including the clear and present danger test.  A number of state 
legislatures have recognized that current First Amendment doctrine 
requires that for the speaker to be punished, the unlawful act must be 
imminent.46  The Arkansas, California, Georgia, Kansas, and North 
Dakota statutes thus all contain language requiring that incitement create 
a clear and present danger of something, ranging from riot more 
generally, to physical harm caused by the riot.47  The Arkansas statute, 
for example, states that a person commits the offense of inciting riot if 
he knowingly “urges others to participate in a riot under circumstances 
that produce a clear and present danger that they will participate in a 
riot.”48  The Georgia statute similarly criminalizes urging others to riot 
“under circumstances which produce a clear and present danger of a 
riot . . . .”49 Kansas criminalizes urging others to riot “under 
 
 42. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5-130 (2011). 
 43. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.08 (2012). 
 44. A number of state courts have recognized that to be constitutional, incitement must be 
defined in a way that conforms to Supreme Court doctrine.  Thus, in New York, the court in People v. 
Tolia held that the elements of intent and “clear and present danger” must be read into the statute for the 
incitement-to-riot statute to be constitutional.  In Louisiana, the court in State v. Douglas read in 
willfulness and immediacy.  North Carolina clarified in State v. Brooks that only advocacy of imminent 
lawless action can come within the purview of the incitement to riot statute.  An Oklahoma court 
recently held that criminalizing incitement to riot is constitutional if it is construed to apply to speech 
that meets the clear and present danger test.  And a Tennessee court restricted the statute’s scope to 
conduct both directed at inciting and producing imminent lawless action, and likely to produce such 
action. 
 45. 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (2011). 
 46. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969). 
 47. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-203 (2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 404.6 (West 2012); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 16-11-31 (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6201(b) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-25-01 
(2011). 
 48. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-203. 
 49. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-31. 
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circumstances which produce a clear and present danger of injury to 
persons or property or a branch of the public peace.”50 
A fourth kind of incitement to riot focuses on likelihood of a riot 
rather than imminence.  Pennsylvania, which has common law 
incitement to riot, neglects to address how soon a riot might occur, but 
instead requires that it must be likely to occur as an outcome of the 
speech.  A defendant is guilty of inciting a riot in Pennsylvania if the 
language used would naturally lead or urge other people to engage in 
conduct that would create a riot.51 
Finally, some states criminalize incitement to riot only in the context 
of an already occurring riot, or a riot that is about to occur.  For 
example, South Dakota and Virginia criminalize directing persons 
participating in a riot to commit acts of force or violence.52  Colorado 
punishes inciting a group to “engage in a current or impending riot,” or 
giving commands “in furtherance of a riot.”53 
States also vary in how they address requisite intent for incitement to 
riot.  In California, one must intend to cause a riot.54  It is not clear, 
however, that one has to intend for that riot to be imminent.  By 
contrast, in Kansas, the inciter must only knowingly urge others to 
engage in riot, under circumstances that produce a clear and present 
danger of a breach of the public peace.55  The inciter need not intend for 
the riot, or the resulting damage, to occur.  Similarly, Montana’s statute 
requires purposely and knowingly committing an act that urges riot, 
rather than intending to urge riot.56  This could penalize a person who 
knowingly sends out a tweet calling only for people to gather, if that 
gathering actually results in a riot.  New York contains no intent 
requirement at all, penalizing urging to riot.57  Georgia strangely 
requires that the speaker have intent to riot, not intent to urge others to 
riot.58  Nevada criminalizes willfully publishing or knowingly 
circulating any book or other printed matter, in any form, inciting the 
commission of any crime.59  This cannot be constitutional, since (1) the 
willfulness attaches to publication or circulation, rather than the 
incitement of the crime, and (2) there is no mention of imminence or 
likelihood at all.  There are further First Amendment problems with this 
 
 50. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6201(b). 
 51. Commonwealth v. Hayes, 209 A.2d 38, 39 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1965). 
 52. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-10-6 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-408 (2011). 
 53. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18.9-102(1) (2012). 
 54. CAL. PENAL CODE § 404.6 (2011). 
 55. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6201(b) (2011). 
 56. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-104(1) (2009). 
 57. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.08 (2012). 
 58. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-31(a) (2012). 
 59. NEV. REV. STAT. § 203.040 (2011). 
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kind of liability for publishers.60 
B. But What is a Riot? 
Examining these five kinds of incitement-to-riot statutes and the kind 
of intent they require gives a general idea of how broadly incitement to 
riot can vary.  But it does not show the whole picture.  If we limit the 
examination of incitement-to-riot statutes to the definition of the word 
incitement, in the way most courts have tended to address them,61 we 
miss First Amendment problems that arise based on the underlying 
definition of riot. 
The crime of riot in many states is not limited to large gatherings that 
cause destruction or harm.  Riot often does not require a large group; 
many states operate on the common law idea that “three’s a crowd.”  
Additionally, in many states, riot is a crime that is already a step 
removed from any actual harm. 
Inciting a riot differs from inciting somebody to rob a bank, because 
the definition of the underlying crime of riot has First Amendment 
implications as well.  In many states, the definition of riot itself 
impinges on freedom of assembly.  Additionally, inciting a riot differs 
from inciting somebody to rob a bank because the underlying definition 
of riot is often based on the creation of a risk or threat of harm, rather 
than physical damage.  While inciting somebody to rob a bank can result 
in direct harm (the bank robbery), inciting a riot can mean that you spur 
others to in turn create a risk of harm, rather than harm itself. 
Under an incitement-to-riot scheme based on this kind of riot statute, 
police would be empowered to go after a speaker for calling for a 
gathering that creates a risk of harm, rather than calling for a gathering 
the purpose of which is to harm somebody or something.  The 
incitement-to-riot standard that defines riot as a gathering that creates a 
risk of harm allows police to conjecture, before a crowd is actually 
gathered, that a speaker will, by assembling a crowd, create a risk of 
harm.  This gives too much leeway to the government in determining 
when a risk will or will not be created.  As one federal court has noted, 
the “imminence of danger or of unlawful activity depends upon the 
immediate circumstances surrounding the expression, including the 
content of expression, size and makeup of the speakers and audience, 
 
 60. See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991).  But see, e.g., 
Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 253 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 61. See, e.g., People v. Tolia, 214 A.D.2d 57, 63–64 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); State v. Douglas, 
278 So.2d 485, 487 (La. 1973); State v. Brooks, 215 S.E.2d 111, 117 (N.C. 1975); Price v. State, 873 
P.2d 1049, 1051 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994). 
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and the sufficiency of the police presence.”62  While it may be 
constitutional to allow police to stop the threat of harm created by an 
already existing crowd, it is not constitutional to allow them to arrest a 
speaker for intentionally calling for what police perceive to be a risky 
situation, rather than for calling for harm itself.  I call this type of 
problem, where the underlying definition of riot is based on risk rather 
than harm, an attenuation problem, because the speaker’s speech and 
intent are several steps removed from any real physical danger. 
This Part therefore begins discussion of incitement to riot by outlining 
the parameters of the legal definition of the underlying crime of riot.  
Where that definition is based on minor harm only, or a threat or risk of 
harm, it creates problems for criminalizing incitement to riot. 
I begin by looking at the common law definition of riot and the 
associated crimes of unlawful assembly and rout.  Then, I outline a 
classification system for assessing the different kinds of state riot laws 
and address the Model Penal Code’s definition of riot, which forms the 
basis for a number of state statutes.  Finally, I discuss how the Federal 
Anti-Riot Act compares to state laws. 
1. Common Law Riot 
Rioting is punishable at common law,63 although most states now 
have statutes to address it.64  In England, the crime arose from at least 
four Parliamentary enactments promulgated in 1328, 1549, 1553, and 
1714.65  
In its earliest manifestations, riot was associated with treason, when 
the tumultuous activity of crowds threatened the King.66  Over time, it 
became an offense against the public peace.67  These origins are 
important because one of the fundamental problems with current riot 
statutes is the treatment of riot as an offense against the public peace 
rather than a crime involving actual violence or damage. 
The common law typically required an assembly of only three people 
 
 62. KKK v. MLK Worshippers, 735 F.Supp. 745, 749 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (striking down a 
parade permit ordinance as unconstitutional because it allowed too much latitude for discriminatory 
denial of a permit, limiting denial to parades that create a “clear and present danger of imminent lawless 
activity” where the permit was applied for 45 days before the parade date). 
 63. See, e.g., United States v. McFarlane, 26 F. Cas.1088, 1088 (C.C.D.C. 1804). 
 64. See Schlamp v. State, 891 A.2d 327, 335 (Md. 2006) (describing the common law crime of 
riot). 
 65. Id. at 331 (citing  REEVES, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 487 (1829); WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, LAWS OF ENGLAND 146–48 (1769)). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.  
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for a riot, a surprisingly small number.68  Riot was part of a trio of 
related escalating offenses.  The first such offense was unlawful 
assembly; the second, rout; and the third, riot.69  Blackstone defines 
unlawful assembly as an assembly “when three, or more, do assemble 
themselves together to do an unlawful act . . . .”70  A rout occurs “where 
three or more meet to do an unlawful act . . . and make some advances 
towards it.”71  A riot occurs “where three or more actually do an 
unlawful act of violence . . . or even do a lawful act . . . in a violent and 
tumultuous manner.”72  
Most states now criminalize both “unlawful assembly” and “riot,” but 
no longer criminalize “rout.” 73  State legislative commentary indicates a 
slight variation on Blackstone’s taxonomy.  Unlawful assembly 
proscribes assembly for the purpose of engaging in riot,74 or with the 
intent to carry out a common purpose in such a manner as to cause 
nearby persons to fear a breach of the peace.75  Rout consists of an act 
towards the unlawful purpose, without its completion.76  Riot is the 
culmination of the two offenses, resulting in force and violence that 
threatens someone publicly.77 
This definition of riot differs from Blackstone because it fails to 
mention the performance of a lawful act in a tumultuous manner.  This 
variation is significant, because it is at the heart of the problem with 
many current riot statutes.  As mentioned, riot, rout, and unlawful 
 
 68. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.705 advisory committee’s cmt. (West 1963) (citing 2 Wharton’s 
Criminal Law § 853 (1957)). 
 69. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-3 cmt. (2012) (explaining that “Alabama statutes are set out in 
traditional common law order: unlawful assembly (former § 13-6-220), rout (former § 13-6-221), and 
riot (former § 13-6-222).”); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.705 advisory committee’s cmt. (West 
1963)  (“The common law recognized three crimes: (1) unlawful assembly, (2) rout, and (3) riot.”); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-103 criminal law commission cmt. (“The common-law misdemeanor, 
‘unlawful assembly,’ was a gathering of three or more persons with the common purpose of committing 
an unlawful act.  When an act was done toward carrying out this purpose, the offense was ‘rout.’  The 
actual beginning of the perpetration of the unlawful act became ‘riot.’”); Schlamp, 891 A.2d at 331 
(“Unlawful assembly, rout, and riot covered a progression of activity.”). 
 70. BLACKSTONE, supra note 65, at 146. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.705 advisory committee’s cmt. (West 1963)  (“Statutes 
now generally govern and rout has usually been eliminated as a separate crime”); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 45-8-103 criminal law commission cmt.; But see CAL. PENAL CODE § 406 (West 2010)  California 
still has rout as a common law crime. 
 74. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.10 cmt.  (McKinney 2012). 
 75. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.705 advisory committee’s cmt. (West 1963). 
 76. Id. (“Rout was an assembly’s act toward putting its unlawful purpose into effect but not yet 
completing it.”); ALA. CODE § 13A-11-3 cmt. (2012) (rout contains “activity in furtherance of the plan 
which occurs between the unlawful assembly and riot, usually the physical movement of the potential 
rioters.”). 
 77. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.705 advisory committee’s cmt.; ALA. CODE § 13A-11-3 cmt. 
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assembly were originally designed to protect the public peace.  The 
public peace is defined as “that tranquility enjoyed by a community 
when good order reigns amongst its members.”78  Common law 
alternatively refers to these offenses as offenses done in terrorem 
populi, offenses that create public terror.79 
Because the original goal of regulating riot was to protect the public 
peace, riot under Blackstone’s definition includes acts that are not 
themselves unlawful, but that are executed “in a violent and turbulent 
manner to the terror of the people.”80  This understanding has made its 
way into many state statutes.  At least one court has decided that it is 
possible to have a riot even if no people are actually shown to be 
terrified, as long as the violent and turbulent acts tend to terrify the 
public.81 
Common-law riot and many of its statutory derivatives are based on 
the idea that the government should be able to protect the public from 
fear.  Large crowds often inherently cause fear or create disturbances.  
Courts have justified the regulation of riot by explaining that the 
presence of a large crowd can itself make an otherwise innocent action 
violate the public peace.82  The threat of riot more generally arises 
“because of the plurality of actors and potential uncontrollability of a 
mob.”83 
Thus, at the heart of the original definition of “riot” there lies a 
particular understanding of the nature of crowd action and the impact it 
can have.  Assessing the size of a crowd for purposes of determining the 
potential for control (or lack thereof) by police or potential damage 
caused is likely constitutionally permissible.  But assessing the size of a 
crowd for determining whether the public might fear it is not. 
Viewed from a First Amendment perspective, the definition of riot 
founded on public peace is troubling.  The creation of fear or public 
discomfort is often part of the goal of large gatherings and is an essential 
element of freedom of assembly.  Assembly, in fact, works as a tool of 
expression because it often creates discomfort in the general public.  
Part VI(A) (on freedom of assembly) will return to this question of 
whether protection of the public peace is a constitutionally acceptable 
goal. 
 
 78. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 609.705 advisory committee’s cmt.  (citing non-Minnesota cases). 
 79. William Hawkins, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 515 (8th ed. 1824). 
 80. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.705 advisory committee’s cmt. 
 81. See, e.g., Briscoe v. State, 240 A.2d 109, 112–13 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968). 
 82. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Donoghue, 63 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Ky. App. 1933) (“[A] 
riot . . . derives its indictability from the plurality of persons concerned . . . .”). 
 83. Clark & Marshall, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 9.09 (7th ed.1967). 
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2. State Laws 
Riot statutes are usually included within a statutory framework of 
related statutes aimed at penalizing the disruption of public order.  In 
many states, the same statutory chapter frequently houses laws 
criminalizing disorderly conduct, fighting words,84 and disruption or 
disturbance of a funeral service.85  Many other statutes under these 
chapters have been found unconstitutional, such as the disorderly 
conduct statutes addressing breach of the peace.86 
Despite the relatively clear common law origins of the crime of riot, 
state anti-riot laws differ substantially along a number of dimensions.  
Nobody has examined in detail what these differences entail, or what 
their significance might be under the First Amendment.87   
First, states vary in how many people are required for an assembly to 
be considered a riot.  Second, they vary greatly in what activity the 
assembly must engage in, from mere threats to actual violence.  Third, 
states differ in the amount of injury or damage required.  And fourth, 
they differ in the level of required knowledge or intent. 
a. The Number of People Required 
One of the justifications for anti-riot measures is that actions or 
intentions that might not be harmful when performed by an individual 
are harmful when performed by a large group.88  This is the reasoning 
behind an early Kentucky case that recognized that conspiracy to use 
violence in the context of a riot “derives its indictability from the 
plurality of persons concerned . . . .”89  Many states, however, define the 
crime of riot as requiring only a small number of people.  It cannot be 
the case that those state laws that define riot as involving as few as two 
or three people protect against harms specific to large gatherings, since 
they criminalize even small assemblies. 
The minimum number of people required for an assembly to be 
considered a riot varies from a mere two people90 to seven people.91  
 
 84. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 2012). 
 85. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.21 (McKinney 2012). 
 86. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 234–35 (1963) (examining South 
Carolina’s definition of “breach of the peace” and finding it to be unconstitutionally broad). 
 87. To my knowledge, nobody has examined the substance of state anti-riot laws and how they 
differ.  A 1985 American Law Report annotation compiled state cases to examine what constitutes 
sufficiently violent conduct to establish the crime of riot in state courts, but did not reach other elements 
of the crime, such as intent or the number of persons involved.  See generally McMahon, supra note 8. 
 88. See infra Part IV(B). 
 89. Commonwealth v. Donoghue, 63 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Ky. App. 1933). 
 90. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 203.020 (2011). 
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Four states require only two people for a gathering to eligible to be a 
riot.92  The bulk of states require a minimum of three people under 
statute or at common law.93  The next most prevalent requirement is a 
minimum of five people.94 Four states require six people,95 and only two 
states require at least seven people for a gathering to come within the 
purview of the riot law.96  The small size of the required gatherings is 
interesting, and even surprising, because one justification for regulating 
riot, discussed above, is the understanding that a large crowd creates 
additional risk—either of harm, or of a breach of the peace.  But two or 
three or even five people is not a large crowd. 
One of the other ways in which riot statutes vary is the amount of 
harm required.  The discrepancies in the number of people required for a 
riot might be understandable if states with lower numerical requirements 
criminalized the group’s conduct only when it caused actual harm, while 
the states with higher numerical requirements penalized the larger group 
for creating a heightened risk of harm due to larger numbers.  This 
would prevent smaller groups from being over-penalized for merely 
gathering.  Massachusetts law provides an example of this type of 
reasoning: the state allows officials to disperse a group of five people if 
they are armed, and ten people if they are not armed.97 
Unfortunately, most states do not follow this reasoning.  Georgia 
penalizes the performance of a lawful act if it is done in a “violent and 
tumultuous manner,” even though Georgia requires only two people for 
 
 91. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-175 (2012). 
 92. CAL. PENAL CODE § 404 (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-30 (2012); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/25-1 (2012); NEV. REV. STAT. § 203.070 (2011). 
 93. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2903 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-201 (2012); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1302 (2012); IOWA CODE § 723.1 (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:329.1 
(2011); MINN. STAT. § 609.71 (2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:1 (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
288.2 (2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1311 (2012); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5501 (2012); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-10-1 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-301(3) (2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 
§ 902 (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-405 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.84.010 (2011). 
 94. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-1322 (2012); IND. CODE Ann. § 35-45-1-2 (2012) (defining rioting 
as recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally engaging in tumultuous conduct while being a member of an 
“unlawful assembly,” defined in § 35-45-1-1 as “an assembly of five (5) or more persons whose 
common object is to commit an unlawful act, or a lawful act by unlawful means”); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 21-6201 (2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-103 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-1 (2012); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 240.05 (McKinney 2012) (riot in the second degree); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-25-01  
(2011) (defining “riot,” criminalized in § 12.1-25-03); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2917.03 (2011). 
 95. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-3 (2012); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.61.100 (2012); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 711-1103 (2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 503 (2011). 
 96. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-175 (2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 574.050 (2010). 
 97. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, § 1 (2012).  By common law, Massachusetts requires the 
presence of three or more people for a riot. See Commonwealth v. Runnels, 10 Mass. 518, 520 (1813); 
Commonwealth v. Porter, 67 Mass. 476, 480 (1854); Commonwealth v. Gibney, 84 Mass. 150, 152 
(1861). 
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a riot.98  California, which also requires only two people for riot, 
penalizes any threat of force or violence, if accompanied by immediate 
power of execution.99  Of the states that require two people for a riot, 
only one—Illinois—explicitly requires the actual use, rather than the 
threat of, illegal force or violence.100  There is no recognition that the 
“gathering” of only two people probably does not exacerbate otherwise 
legal activity to the point of creating a heightened risk of harm, or even 
public terror. 
Thus, even if one accepts the prevention of public fear as a 
constitutional goal (which I do not), penalizing a gathering of two 
people for performing a lawful act in a “tumultuous manner” cannot be 
justified by saying that crowd dynamics require more regulation than 
individual actions. 
b. The Group’s Actions 
This brings us to a second dimension of riot statutes: variations in the 
nature of the activity the group must engage in for the gathering to be 
considered a riot.  State anti-riot laws range from penalizing the use of 
force or violence, to penalizing creation of the risk of violence, to 
penalizing mere disorderly conduct. 
A 1985 American Law Report annotation examined what conduct is 
required to establish the crime of riot.  The annotation reviewed case 
law, but did not look at the underlying statutory language.101  
Nonetheless, its observations are useful as a starting point.  The 
annotation observed that some courts require that alleged acts must be 
unlawful.102  Other courts established two kinds of riot: those consisting 
of unlawful acts and those consisting of lawful acts done in a violent and 
tumultuous manner.103  Some courts required both tumult and 
violence,104 while others noted that the strength of defendants’ numbers 
made it unnecessary to show even noise, boisterousness, or tumult.105 
The statutes themselves clarify these standards.  State anti-riot 
statutes require one of the following for a gathering to be considered a 
riot: the use of force or violence, engagement in “tumultuous and violent 
 
 98. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-30 (2012). 
 99. CAL. PENAL CODE § 404(a) (2012). 
 100. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.  5/25-1(a) (2012). 
 101. McMahon, supra note 8, § 1[a] (noting that “[s]ince relevant statutes are included only to the 
extent that they are reflected in the reported cases within the scope of this annotation, the reader is 
advised to consult the latest enactments of pertinent jurisdictions.”). 
 102. Id. § 4[a]. 
 103. Id. § 4[b]. 
 104. Id. § 5[a]. 
 105. Id. § 5[b]. 
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conduct,” participation in disorderly conduct, the threat of force or 
violence, or the threat of tumultuous and violent conduct. 
Only a handful of state laws define riot as involving, at minimum, the 
actual use of force or violence by the gathered group.  Virginia bans 
assembly with the “unlawful use . . . of force or violence which 
seriously jeopardizes the public safety, peace or order . . . .”106  Missouri 
bans the group violation of any criminal law with force or violence.107  
Iowa bans groups “assembled together in a violent manner, to the 
disturbance of others, and with any use of unlawful force or violence by 
them or any of them . . . .”108 
A number of states define riot not as requiring the use of force and 
violence, but as involving group engagement in “tumultuous and violent 
conduct.”109 It is not entirely clear what this means.  It may just be 
another way of describing the use of force and violence, or it might 
describe the lesser misdeed of being an unruly crowd. 
For example, at one end of the spectrum, Indiana understands 
tumultuous conduct as the use of actual force or violence, defining it as 
conduct that results in or is likely to result in serious bodily injury to a 
person or substantial property damage.110  At the other end of the 
spectrum, Connecticut appears to understand tumultuous conduct as 
frightening conduct rather than physically harmful conduct, penalizing 
riot in the first degree where the use of tumultuous conduct recklessly 
causes or creates a grave risk of public alarm.111  Maryland courts 
similarly penalize assembling “in such a violent or turbulent manner as 
to terrify others.”112 
The statutory use of “force and violence” may initially have been 
understood not to be referring to physical force, and thus was 
synonymous with “tumultuous conduct.”  For example, when the 
Virginia statute bans the unlawful use of force or violence that seriously 
jeopardizes the public peace, it may in fact be referring to disorderly 
conduct and not force as we traditionally understand it.  A 1920 case in 
Massachusetts, Commonwealth v. Frishman, explained that “[i]f 
 
 106. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-405 (2012). 
 107. MO. REV. STAT. § 574.050 (2012). 
 108. IOWA CODE § 723.1 (2012). 
 109. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-3(a) (2012); ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.100(a) (2012); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 5-71-201(a) (2012); IND. CODE § 35-45-1-2 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, § 1 (2012); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 203.070 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-25-01 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-
301(3) (2012); Cohen v. State, 195 A. 532, 534 (Md. 1937). 
 110. IND. CODE § 35-45-1-1 (2012) (defining “Tumultuous Conduct” as “conduct that results in, 
or is likely to result in, serious bodily injury to a person or substantial damage to property”). 
 111. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-175(a) (2012) (“A person is guilty of riot in the first degree when 
simultaneously with two or more other persons he engages in tumultuous and violent conduct and 
thereby intentionally or recklessly causes or creates a grave risk of causing public alarm.”). 
 112. Cohen, 195 A. at 534. 
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defendants were acting in concert with others for a common unlawful 
purpose, that is, by force and violence to march or parade on a public 
street without permission . . . it was not necessary, to constitute a riot, 
that all should commit some physical act.”113  In Massachusetts at least, 
the mere disorderly gathering of the group, with a physical act by one or 
more member of the group, is sufficient to constitute a riot, even when 
“force or violence” is a statutory element of the crime. 
Several state anti-riot laws mirror the Model Penal Code by banning 
group participation in a “course of disorderly conduct.”  However, those 
states add an intentionality requirement to the action so that they do not 
ban disorderly conduct alone.  Instead, they require that the disorderly 
conduct be performed with the intent to do something, such as commit a 
felony,114 commit or facilitate a misdemeanor,115 intimidate an official, 
or obstruct a function of government.116  These states also ban group 
participation in disorderly conduct, where a participant uses or plans to 
use a firearm or other deadly weapon, or knows that another participant 
plans to use a weapon.117 
A surprising number of states penalize the mere threat of force or 
violence, rather than actual force or violence.118  In Arizona, California, 
Kansas, and Oklahoma, that threat must be accompanied by the 
immediate power of execution, but there is no requirement that 
execution in fact be likely.119  For example, the Arizona statute defines 
riot as including when a “person . . . threatens to use force or violence, if 
such threat is accompanied by immediate power of execution, which 
disturbs the public peace.”120  In California and Minnesota, the force that 
is being threatened must also be unlawful.121 In Minnesota, the 
requirement of immediate power of execution of such a threat has been 
read into the statute by courts.122  In Washington and Minnesota, the 
threatened use of force must be against another person or property.123 
Three states penalize the threat of tumultuous and violent conduct 
 
 113. 126 N.E. 838, 840  (Mass. 1920). 
 114. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5501. 
 115. See, e.g., id. 
 116. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2917.03(A)(1)–(3). 
 117. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1302 (2012). 
 118. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2903 (2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 404 (2012); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-6201 (2012); MINN. STAT. § 609.71 (2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-103 (2011); OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 21, § 1311 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-10-1 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.84.010 
(2011). 
 119. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2903; CAL. PENAL CODE § 404(a); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
6201(a)(2); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1311. 
 120. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2903. 
 121. CAL. PENAL CODE § 404(a); MINN. STAT. § 609.71. 
 122. State v. Winkels, 283 N.W. 763, 764 (Minn. 1939). 
 123. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.84.010(1). 
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instead of a threat of force or violence.124  However, these states require 
that the threat of tumultuous and violent conduct create a clear and 
present danger (or grave danger) of “injury or damage” to persons or 
property.125 
c. The Injury or Damage Required 
States vary in how many people are required for a riot—from two to 
seven—and what those people must do once assembled—from 
threatening tumultuous conduct, to engaging in disorderly conduct, to 
committing physical violence.  The next dimension across which states 
vary is in the kind of injury or damage required from the group conduct, 
if any. 
State requirements range from a risk of disturbance to the public 
peace, to the actual disturbance of the public peace, to physical injury 
and property damage.  The damage requirement is perhaps the most 
important distinction between riot statutes, because it indicates whether 
the statute is based on preventing a breach of the public peace or on 
preventing harm to other people or property. 
Starting with the highest bar to prosecution, at least two states require 
physical injury or property damage.  In New York, riot in the first 
degree requires “physical injury or substantial property damage” to 
result from tumultuous and violent conduct causing a risk of public 
alarm.126  In Iowa, the use of unlawful force or violence must be against 
another person or cause property damage.127  Virginia penalizes the 
unlawful use of force or violence that “seriously jeopardizes the public 
safety, peace or order.”128  Even though Virginia does not explicitly state 
that it requires injury or damage, it might be implied because it requires 
the use of force or violence.  But as discussed above, “force or violence” 
under common law sometimes in fact means disorderly conduct.  One 
hopes that a current court would interpret the phrase more strictly to 
 
 124. D.C. CODE § 22-1322(a) (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329.1 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 14-288.2(a) (2011) (penalizing “disorderly and violent conduct”). 
 125. D.C. CODE § 22-1322(a) (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329.1 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 14-288.2(a) (2011). 
 126. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.06 (2012) (a person is guilty of riot in the first degree when he 
“[s]imultaneously with ten or more other persons, engages in tumultuous and violent conduct and 
thereby intentionally or recklessly causes or creates a grave risk of causing public alarm, and in the 
course of and as a result of such conduct, a person other than one of the participants suffers physical 
injury or substantial property damage occurs”). 
 127. IOWA CODE § 723.1 (2012) (“A riot is three or more persons assembled together in a violent 
manner, to the disturbance of others, and with any use of unlawful force or violence by them or any of 
them against another person, or causing property damage.”). 
 128. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-405 (2012) (“Any unlawful use, by three or more persons acting 
together, of force or violence which seriously jeopardizes the public safety, peace or order is riot.”). 
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mean actual physical violence. 
Several courts have agreed, however, that neither property damage 
nor personal injury is necessary for a conviction for riot.129  Some states 
require only the creation of a risk of physical injury or property damage, 
while others require even less: a threat of injury or damage, without a 
likelihood that the threat will actually be executed.  The last category of 
statutes requires no risk of damage or threat of damage—just a risk of 
public alarm. 
A number of states do not require that the group actually cause 
damage; rather it must only create a danger of physical injury or 
property damage.130  Some of these laws require likelihood of damage to 
person or property;131 others require a substantial risk of damage;132 
others require a “grave danger” of damage;133 and others require a clear 
and present danger of damage.134 
Several states do not require damage or a risk of damage.  These 
states require that the group disturb public peace through a threat of 
force or violence without a requirement that the threat be likely to be 
acted on.  Thus, although at first reading these statutes may look like 
they require force and violence, they in fact require only an actionable 
threat that disturbs the public peace.  Arizona penalizes a threat of force 
or violence that disturbs the public peace when that threat is 
accompanied by immediate power of execution.135  But Arizona does 
not state that the threat must in fact be likely to be acted on, or must 
cause a reasonable fear of bodily harm.136  Minnesota similarly 
criminalizes the disturbance of the public peace by a “threat of unlawful 
force or violence to person or property.”137  Courts in Minnesota have 
added in a requirement that the threatener have the immediate power of 
execution, though like Arizona they did not add the requirement that it 
 
 129. See McMahon, supra note 8, § 3[a]. 
 130. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.100(a) (2012); D.C. CODE § 22-1322(a) (2012); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 329.1 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.2(a) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-25-01 (2011); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-301(3) (2012). 
 131. IND. CODE § 35-45-1-1 (2012) (defining “Tumultuous Conduct” as “conduct that results in, 
or is likely to result in, serious bodily injury to a person or substantial damage to property”). 
 132. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.100(a). 
 133. D.C. CODE § 22-1322(a); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-25-01; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-
301(3). 
 134. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329.1; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.2(a). MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-
103(1) (2011) (prohibits disturbing the public peace by threatening to commit an act of violence, where 
that threat presents a clear and present danger of damage to property or injury to persons). 
 135. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2903 (2012) (“A person commits riot if, with two or more other 
persons acting together, such person recklessly uses force or violence or threatens to use force or 
violence, if such threat is accompanied by immediate power of execution, which disturbs the public 
peace.”). 
 136. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003). 
 137. MINN. STAT. § 609.71 (2012). 
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be likely that the threat will be acted on and damage will in fact be 
done.138 
A number of states penalize group actions that create only a risk of 
public alarm.139  In Arkansas and New Hampshire, the risk of public 
alarm must be “substantial,”140 but this does not mitigate the problem.  
Because they are so problematic, these statutes are outlined individually 
below. 
In Arkansas, a “person commits the offense of riot if, with two (2) or 
more other persons, he or she knowingly engages in tumultuous or 
violent conduct that creates a substantial risk of: (1) Causing public 
alarm,” among other things.141 In Arkansas, a person can be penalized 
under this riot statute by being part of a three-person gathering and 
knowingly engaging in tumultuous conduct that creates a risk of public 
alarm. 
In Alabama, a “person commits the crime of riot if, with five or more 
other persons, he wrongfully engages in tumultuous and violent conduct 
and thereby intentionally or recklessly causes or creates a grave risk of 
public terror or alarm.”142  On a facial reading, this statute criminalizes 
gathering as a six-person group, and “wrongfully” engaging in 
“tumultuous and violent” conduct, recklessly creating a grave risk of 
public alarm.  A 1981 Alabama criminal case narrowed the scope of this 
statute slightly by explaining that “tumultuous and violent conduct” 
means more than loud noise or disturbance, describing such conduct as 
ominous threats of injury, stone throwing, or other terrorizing acts.143  
The court also explained, however, that the statute requires only conduct 
that causes a grave risk of terror, and where the nature of the conduct is 
calculated to cause terror it may be a riot even if only one person was in 
fact terrified. 
In Connecticut, a “person is guilty of riot in the first degree when 
simultaneously with six or more other persons he engages in tumultuous 
and violent conduct and thereby intentionally or recklessly causes or 
creates a grave risk of causing public alarm.”144  This is potentially more 
 
 138. See State v. Winkels, 283 N.W. 763, 764 (Minn. 1939). 
 139. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-3(a) (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-201(a)(1) (2012); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 53a-175(a) (2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:1(2012); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.05 
(McKinney 2012). 
 140. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-201(a)(1); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:1. 
 141. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-201(a)(1). 
 142. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-3(a). 
 143. Campbell v. City of Birmingham, 405 So.2d 65, 67 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981).  The court noted 
that a lawful assembly may become an unlawful assembly due to a concerted intention to break the 
peace.  Id. at 68. 
 144. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-175(a); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.05 (“A person is guilty of riot in 
the second degree when, simultaneously with four or more other persons, he engages in tumultuous and 
violent conduct and thereby intentionally or recklessly causes or creates a grave risk of causing public 
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encompassing than the Arkansas statute, because it requires only 
recklessness rather than knowledge.  New York has a similar riot statute.  
However, like the Alabama statute, the Connecticut and New York 
statutes link “tumultuous and violent conduct” where the Arkansas 
statute describes them as distinct things: “tumultuous or violent.”  
Remember that riot in the first degree in New York does contain a 
requirement of “physical injury or substantial property damage,” 
implying that riot in the second degree does not.  
In New Hampshire, a person is guilty of riot if “he engages in 
tumultuous or violent conduct and thereby purposely or recklessly 
creates a substantial risk of causing public alarm.”145  New Hampshire 
courts have recognized that this statute is problematic, and read into the 
statute a requirement that the crowd intentionally embark on concerted 
criminal (unlawful) action.146  The statute could not apply to peaceable 
assembles with minor incidental breaches of law by some of the 
participants.147 
This final category of damage—a risk of public alarm—is the most 
problematic category, because of the tension between freedom of 
assembly and public fear.  Whether these statutes are unconstitutional 
violations of freedom of assembly likely depends on how “tumultuous 
and violent conduct” is defined.  Part VI(A) (freedom of assembly 
section) addresses this further. 
d. The Level of Knowledge or Intent 
The last significant variation in state riot statutes is the variation in 
the level of knowledge or intent required by participants.  A number of 
states have no mention of the level of intent required, so the 
presumption is that the required intent is recklessness.148  Several states 
explicitly require only recklessness.149  On the other hand, a number of 
states require action “with intent” or “with purpose.”  For example, the 
category of states that require only disorderly conduct require that 
disorderly conduct be committed with the intent to commit a felony, or 
 
alarm.”). 
 145. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:1 (2012). 
 146. See State v. Albers 303 A.2d 197, 201 (N.H. 1973) (decided under prior law). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.100(a) (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6201 (2012). See 
MODEL PENAL CODE §2.02(3) (2011) (“When the culpability sufficient to establish a material element 
of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly 
or recklessly with respect thereto.”). 
 149. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2903 (2012); ALA. CODE § 13A-11-3(a) (2012); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 53a-175(a); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/25-1(a) (2012)); IND. CODE § 35-45-1-2 (2012); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:1; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.05. 
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commit or facilitate a misdemeanor, or prevent or coerce official 
action.150 
A number of states require knowledge.  Tennessee penalizes a person 
“who knowingly participates in a riot.”151  Washington penalizes a 
person who knowingly uses or threatens to use force.152  Arkansas 
confusingly penalizes knowingly engaging in tumultuous or violence 
conduct that creates a substantial risk of one of three outcomes; but it is 
not clear if the knowledge must extend to the outcome, or only the 
participation in the tumultuous conduct.153  And the above-mentioned 
category of states that penalize disorderly conduct with intent also 
penalize disorderly conduct with mere knowledge where that knowledge 
is that a participant plans to use a firearm or other deadly weapon.154 
In some states, the riot statute makes it explicit that the intent must be 
shared by the whole group.  In Georgia, for example, participants in a 
riot must have a shared intent to do an unlawful act of violence, or some 
other act in a violent and tumultuous manner.155  In South Dakota, 
participants must be “acting together.”156  In Louisiana, persons must be 
acting together or in concert.157  Maryland requires that participants be 
“assembled to carry out a common purpose.”158  These joint intent 
questions go to the issues raised by the Supreme Court in NAACP v. 
Claiborne,159 on whether a person can be liable for actions of the group 
as a whole.  Presumably, NAACP requires shared intent in order for one 
individual in a group to be liable for the actions of another individual. 
3. Model Penal Code 
Under the Model Penal Code, a person is guilty of riot “if he 
participates with [two] or more others in a course of disorderly conduct: 
(a) with purpose to commit or facilitate the commission or a felony or 
misdemeanor; (b) with purpose to prevent or coerce official action; or 
(c) when the actor or any other participant to the knowledge of the actor 
uses or plans to use a firearm or other deadly weapon.”160  A number of 
 
 150. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1302 (2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1103(1) (2012); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2C:33-1 (2011); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5501 (2012). 
 151. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-302(a) (2012). 
 152. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.84.010(1) (2011). 
 153. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-201(a) (2012). 
 154. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1103(1)(b); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5501. 
 155. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-30 (2012). 
 156. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-10-1 (2012). 
 157. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329.1 (2011). 
 158. Cohen v. State, 195 A. 532, 534 (Md. 1937). 
 159. 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
 160. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.1 (2011). 
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states have adopted the Model Penal Code’s formulation essentially 
verbatim,161 or with only small changes.162 
Disorderly conduct itself is an offense under the Model Penal Code, 
under section 250.2.  Its definition includes acting with a purpose “to 
cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience” after reasonable 
warning or request to desist.163  So, to commit riot under the Model 
Penal Code and statutes based on the Model Penal Code, one must 
engage in tumultuous behavior that recklessly creates a risk of public 
inconvenience, with the purpose of committing a felony or 
misdemeanor, or with the purpose of preventing or coercing official 
action, or with the knowledge that another participant plans to use a 
deadly weapon. 
4. The Federal Anti-Riot Act 
In 1968, one year before Brandenburg was decided, Congress enacted 
the Federal Anti-Riot Act.164  The Anti-Riot Act differs from state riot 
laws in that it does not criminalize rioting itself.  Instead, it criminalizes 
interstate travel or the use of interstate commerce, including the use of 
mail, telephone, or radio, with intent to do one of four things: (A) incite 
a riot; (B) organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on a 
riot; (C) commit any act of violence in furtherance of a riot; or (D) aid 
or abet any person in inciting, participating in, or carrying on a riot, with 
an overt act for that purpose.165  
Despite the fact that federal law does not criminalize rioting itself, it 
does define “riot.”166  Consistent with the common law definition, 
Congress defined “riot” as a public disturbance involving an assemblage 
of three or more persons.167  To be a riot, that public disturbance must 
involve either an act of violence or a threat of the commission of an act 
of violence.168  For a threat of violence to constitute riot, the group of 
people must individually or collectively have the ability to immediately 
execute the threat with actual violence.169  That act of violence must in 
turn either result in damage or pose a clear and present danger of 
 
 161. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1302 (2012); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5501 (2012). 
 162. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 503 (2011) (excluding from the definition of riot 
disorderly conduct with purpose to prevent or coerce official action). 
 163. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.2 (2011). 
 164. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 2102 (2011). 
 165. 18 U.S.C. § 2101. 
 166. See 18 U.S.C. § 2102. 
 167. 18 U.S.C. § 2102(a). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. § 2102(a)(2). 
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damage or injury.170 
This definition, like many of the state law definitions of riot, contains 
both a clearly unproblematic description of riot and a more problematic 
version.  One can imagine an unproblematic scenario involving three or 
more people assembling to create a public disturbance involving an act 
of violence that damages or injures property or a person.  The more 
problematic scenario involves three or more people creating a public 
disturbance by threatening to commit an act of violence that would not 
actually damage anything or anyone but could create a clear and present 
danger of damage.  The threat must be backed up by at least one 
person’s ability to immediately execute it.  However, the statute says 
nothing about the intent of the other members of the group if only one 
person is making the threat, and it says nothing about the likelihood that 
the violence would be committed, only the individual’s ability to carry it 
out. 
This definition of riot is made more problematic by the fact that what 
federal law actually bans is not the riot itself, but interstate travel or 
interstate communication with intent to incite a riot, organize a riot, or 
aid and abet a person in inciting a riot.  A number of courts have 
considered the constitutionality of the Anti-Riot Act; these cases will be 
discussed below.171 
C. Examples of Potentially Problematic Statutes and Statutory Schemes 
The potential constitutional problems with incitement to riot occur on 
three planes.  The first is in the definition of incitement, where the 
statute might not contain an adequate definition of the elements of 
incitement, or any definition at all.  The Supreme Court in Brandenburg 
explained that for a state to constitutionally criminalize incitement to an 
unlawful action, the speech must be “directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and [be] likely to incite or produce such 
action.”172  Many states do not include these requirements.  The second 
potential constitutional problem is in the definition of riot, which might 
itself violate freedom of assembly.  And the third occurs as a 
combination of the two statutes: where incitement to riot might present a 
statutory scheme in which speech is attenuated from actual harm.  The 
third problem leads to two key questions about Brandenburg: first, 
whether it applies to “lawless” action, or to harmful action, and second, 
how the imminence standard applies to a harm that itself contains an 
 
 170. Id. § 2102(a)(1)–(2). 
 171. See Part VI(E), infra. 
 172. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
28
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss1/1
2012] INCITEMENT TO RIOT 29 
imminence standard.173   
1. Incitement Definition Problem 
Kentucky’s incitement-to-riot statute is an example of a statute that 
fails to include any definition of the term “incitement,” and thus fails to 
include on its face the First Amendment’s requirements.  The Kentucky 
statute states that a “person is guilty of inciting to riot when he incites or 
urges five (5) or more persons to create or engage in a riot.”174  There is 
no mention of imminence, likelihood, or intent.  In fact, Kentucky goes 
further than many states, and is explicit in the legislative history that it 
does not require even a clear and present danger test.  The 1974 
Kentucky legislative commentary explains that “urging creates a grave 
danger of property damage, personal injury, or substantial obstruction of 
governmental function.  It is felt that this standard protects the freedom 
of speech without allowing the situation to develop to the point where 
there is a clear and present danger of riot.”175   
Note that the Federal Anti-Riot Statute, like Kentucky, also does not 
on its face contain any of the elements of “incitement” required by the 
First Amendment. 
2. Riot Might Violate Freedom of Assembly 
Arkansas’s riot statute is an example of a statute that may violate 
freedom of assembly because it penalizes tumultuous conduct that 
causes public alarm, rather than physically violent conduct that causes 
physical harm.  In Arkansas, “a person commits the offense of riot if, 
with two (2) or more other persons, he or she knowingly engages in 
tumultuous or violent conduct that creates a substantial risk 
of . . . causing public alarm,” among other things.176  Courts in New 
Hampshire narrowed a similar statute to intentional criminal action, 
recognizing the problems in the breadth of the definition.177 
A second type of riot statute that might present problems for freedom 
of assembly is the kind regarding threats of violence rather than violence 
itself.  Arizona penalizes a threat of force or violence that disturbs the 
public peace when that threat is accompanied by immediate power of 
 
 173. The transferability of imminence is at issue in the Federal Anti-Riot Act cases. 
 174. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.040(1) (2012). 
 175. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.040 LRC committee’s cmt. (1974). 
 176. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-201(a)(1) (2012). 
 177. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:1 (2012); State v. Albers, 303 A.2d 197, 201 (N.H. 1973) 
(decided under prior law). 
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execution.178  In 1976, an Arizona court found this definition neither 
vague nor overbroad.179  The question presented is whether “peaceable 
assembly” means assembly that is not violent (an assembly where 
violence is merely threatened is not in fact yet a violent assembly), or 
assembly that does not even threaten violence.  This is actually 
somewhat of an open question under Supreme Court doctrine. 
3. The Combination of Incitement and Riot Attenuates from Actual 
Harm 
The third type of problematic statute creates an additional layer of 
attenuation between the call for action and any actual harm.  There are 
four types of harm attenuation that result from combining incitement to 
riot with the different underlying definitions of riot.  The problem arises 
because of the combined statutory scheme, not necessarily because 
either element is itself unconstitutional. 
The first type of attenuation occurs when riot is defined to include a 
threat of harm.  The second type occurs when riot is defined as creating 
a risk of harm.  The third type is when riot is defined as causing public 
alarm (which, as mentioned, is itself likely an unconstitutional violation 
of freedom of assembly).  The fourth type of attenuation concerns the 
Model Penal Code scheme, which defines riot as disorderly conduct 
with intent. 
Attenuation is problematic because it requires guesswork by the 
government about the potential risk in a situation that does not yet exist.  
The crime of inciting a group to commit violence is potentially worth 
preventing.  But when a person calls for a group to gather and police are 
asked to determine if the call creates a risk of harm, that gives too much 
discretion to police, because without an actual gathering they lack the 
necessary information about whether the risk will be real—including the 
adequacy of police presence, the number of people present, and the 
rowdiness of the actual crowd. 
a. Riot Based on a Threat of Harm 
Four states have an underlying definition of riot based on creating a 
threat of harm, rather than harm itself: Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, and 
 
 178. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2903 (2012) (“A person commits riot if, with two or more other 
persons acting together, such person recklessly uses force or violence or threatens to use force or 
violence, if such threat is accompanied by immediate power of execution, which disturbs the public 
peace.”). 
 179. See State v. Urias, 553 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976). 
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North Carolina.180  Of these states, Louisiana’s statute is perhaps the 
best bad example, since the other states have attempted to mitigate the 
damage.181 
Louisiana defines inciting to riot as follows: “Inciting to riot is the 
endeavor by any person to incite or procure any other person to create or 
participate in a riot.”182  A court read in the requirement that incitement 
to riot include both willfulness and immediacy.183  The underlying 
definition of riot in Louisiana is: 
[A] public disturbance involving an assemblage of three or more persons 
acting together or in concert which by tumultuous and violent conduct, or 
the imminent threat of tumultuous and violent conduct, results in injury or 
damage to persons or property or creates a clear and present danger of 
injury or damage to persons or property.184 
Read in the most problematic way, this statute criminalizes an 
assemblage which by the imminent threat of tumultuous and violent 
conduct creates a clear and present danger of injury or damage to 
persons or property.  So inciting to riot in Louisiana, without further 
narrowing by courts, can consist of wilfully inciting an imminent 
assembly to an imminent threat of tumultuous conduct that itself creates 
a clear and present danger of damage.  The three levels of imminence—
the assembly is imminent, the threat of tumultuous conduct is imminent, 
and the danger of damage posed by the threat is imminent (or clear and 
present)—mean that the actual call for action is three imminences 
removed from real damage.  Louisiana courts have upheld this definition 
 
 180. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6201(b) (2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329.2 (2011); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 45-8-104(1) (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.2 (2011). 
 181. Kansas bans incitement to riot “under circumstances which produce a clear and present 
danger of injury to persons or property or a branch of the public peace.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6201(b).  
The Montana legislature tried to limit the Montana incitement statute’s scope by explaining that the “act 
or conduct may not include the mere oral or written advocacy of ideas or expression of belief that does 
not urge the commission of an act of immediate violence.” MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-104(1).  This 
sentence may be adequate to make  Montana’s laws constitutional if the requirement that incitement 
“urge the commission of an act of immediate violence” apply to all incitement, not just “mere oral or 
written advocacy of ideas or expression of belief,” because a person calling for an assembly is not 
merely advocating ideas or expressing a belief.  See id.  North Carolina’s incitement law requires that 
the riot have actually resulted in property damage or personal injury, but contains no language requiring 
that the inciter have intended that damage to be caused when he or she incited the riot.  See N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 14-288.2(e) (“Any person who willfully incites or urges another to engage in a riot, and such 
inciting or urging is a contributing cause of a riot in which there is property damage in excess of fifteen 
hundred dollars ($1,500) or serious bodily injury, shall be punished as a Class F felon.”).  A North 
Carolina case, State v. Brooks, reads a requirement that the inciter advocate imminent lawless action into 
North Carolina’s incitement statute, but again riot itself can be considered lawless action so this does not 
mitigate the problem caused by defining riot as including threats.  See 215 S.E.2d 111, 118 (N.C. 1975). 
 182. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329.2 (2011). 
 183. State v. Douglas, 278 So.2d 485, 487 (La. 1973). 
 184. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329.1 (2011). 
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despite overbreadth and vagueness challenges.185  
b. Riot as a Risk of Harm 
The second type of attenuation from harm occurs when the 
underlying riot statute contains a definition of riot that encompasses the 
creation of a risk of harm.  Colorado, Kentucky, Arkansas, and 
Tennessee all include risk of some kind of harm in their definition of 
riot.186  
In Tennessee, riot is “a disturbance in a public place . . . involving an 
assemblage of three (3) or more persons which, by tumultuous and 
violent conduct, creates grave danger of substantial damage to property 
or serious bodily injury to persons or substantially obstructs law 
enforcement or other governmental function . . . .”187  A person who 
incites a riot simply “incites or urges three (3) or more persons to create 
or engage in a riot.”188  A Tennessee court found this statute not 
overbroad, construing it to cover only conduct directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action.  But this ignores the underlying 
problem with defining riot itself as risk-based.  If “riot” is lawless 
action, then inciting riot would be constitutional under this standard, no 
matter the definition of riot, and notwithstanding any attenuation.189  
c. Riot as Public Alarm or a Risk of Public Alarm 
As discussed, a number of states define riot as the creation of public 
alarm or a risk of public alarm.  Arkansas penalizes “the offense of riot 
if, with two (2) or more other persons, he or she knowingly engages in 
tumultuous or violent conduct that creates a substantial risk of: (1) 
Causing public alarm . . . .”190  Incitement to riot in Arkansas is defined 
as “knowingly: (1) [b]y speech or conduct urg[ing] others to participate 
in a riot under circumstances that produce a clear and present danger 
that they will participate in a riot . . . .”191  Leaving aside for a moment 
 
 185. Douglas v. Pitcher, 319 F. Supp. 706, 713 (E.D. La. 1970). 
 186. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-102(1); see also People v. Bridges, 620 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo. 1980); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.040, LRC committee’s cmt. (1974) (“‘Riot’ is defined as a public 
disturbance involving an assemblage of five (5) or more persons which by tumultuous and violent 
conduct creates grave danger of damage or injury to property or persons or substantially obstructs law 
enforcement or government function.”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-201 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
17-304(a). 
 187. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-301(3) (2012). 
 188. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-304(a). 
 189. See Original Fayette Cnty. Civic & Welfare League, Inc. v. Ellington, 309 F. Supp. 89, 94 
(W.D. Tenn. 1970). 
 190. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-201(a)(1). 
 191. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-203 (2012). 
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the fact that the underlying riot statute might violate freedom of 
assembly, the statutory scheme of incitement to riot penalizes a 
gathering of three or more people that creates a clear and present danger 
that the group will knowingly engage in tumultuous conduct that itself 
creates a risk of causing public alarm. 
d. Model Penal Code Riot 
The fourth problematic category of incitement statutes are those based 
on the Model Penal Code definition of riot, which penalizes disorderly 
conduct with the intent to commit a felony or intent to prevent or coerce 
official action.  Criminalizing incitement to this kind of riot is troubling 
because of Brandenburg’s requirement of the inciter’s intent.  This 
creates a nesting, not of speech acts, but of intent: the inciter must intend 
that the listeners perform disorderly conduct with their own intent to do 
a proscribed thing.  Thus, prosecuting a statute of this kind would 
involve showing the inciter’s intent to cause intent. 
Pennsylvania is the only clear example of this category.  
Pennsylvania bases its definition of riot on the Model Penal Code, 
criminalizing disorderly conduct with intent to commit or facilitate a 
misdemeanor or felony, or with intent to prevent or coerce official 
action.  Pennsylvania has common law incitement to riot, defined as 
course or conduct by use of words, signs, or language or any other 
means by which one can be urged on to action as would naturally lead or 
urge other men to engage in or enter upon conduct which if completed 
would make a riot.192 
This definition presents a paradox under Brandenburg: Pennsylvania 
criminalizes urging another person to perform disorderly conduct with 
intent to commit or facilitate a misdemeanor, and Brandenburg requires 
that such urging be intentional.  Thus, to be liable for incitement to riot 
in Pennsylvania, an inciter would have to intend to cause intent, but not 
the felony or misdemeanor itself.  This is like inciting an inchoate 
crime.193 
V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT: INCITEMENT AND THE TREATMENT OF 
CROWDS 
Incitement to riot touches on two First Amendment protections: 
freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.  This Part explains how 
First Amendment theory justifies protecting speech that calls somebody 
 
 192. See Commonwealth v. Hayes, 209 A.2d 38, 39 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1965). 
 193. When police do this, it is considered entrapment.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (2011). 
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to action, and how it justifies protecting assembly.  It outlines the history 
of First Amendment jurisprudence on incitement and explains the 
current doctrinal standard for incitement in Brandenburg v. Ohio.194  It 
then turns to peaceable freedom of assembly—not the familiar time, 
place, and manner test, but cases that concern the conduct of those 
assembled.  Because riot does not involve the traditional question of 
time, place, and manner restriction, it presents an opportunity for an 
alternate discussion of what freedom of assembly really means. 
A. First Amendment Theory and Incitement 
The Supreme Court established a First Amendment standard 
governing incitement that should constrain all incitement-to-riot 
statutes.195  This Subpart examines the theory behind granting First 
Amendment protection to speech that incites action.  A number of 
theories can be used to justify such First Amendment protection.  Which 
theory a court applies can affect the scope of protection afforded that 
speech.196 
Under the “marketplace of ideas” theory, speech is protected so that 
an individual can gather information and weigh competing ideas on the 
path to determining the truth.197  A second theory has been described as 
a theory of democratic self-governance, which protects the process of 
governance and the establishment of democratic legitimacy.198  A third 
rationale, the “safety valve” theory, argues that speech should be 
protected because that protection allows catharsis for those who are 
dissatisfied.199  A fourth rationale focuses on individual liberty.200  
Advocacy of unlawful action can be protected under any of these 
theories, but the scope of its protection might change.201 
Brandenburg was a short per curiam decision, and it is thus difficult 
 
 194. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 195. Id. 
 196. See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 
CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2363 (2000) (explaining that “[a]lmost from its inception, First Amendment doctrine 
has been caught in the crossfire between these two theories of freedom of speech”). 
 197. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); JOHN 
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 32–35 (2001). 
 198. Id. 
 199. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970); Steven 
Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REV. 915, 
949 (1978). 
 200. C. Edwin Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First Amendment, 55 
S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 293 (1982). 
 201. But see Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In 
Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1163–65 (1982) (arguing that none of the 
First Amendment rationales protect advocacy of unlawful action). 
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to determine which First Amendment theory the Court applied.  In the 
absence of clear direction from the Court, it is worth examining whether 
different theories might protect a call to action in different ways. 
The marketplace of ideas theory can be understood as more strongly 
protecting those ideas that are valuable as part of a pursuit of truth, or as 
Robert Post describes them, ideas with a “truth-seeking function.”202  
Under this theory, speech that calls for action would be more strongly 
protected if it has a truth-seeking function.  However, such speech often 
does not service such a function.  Thus, the marketplace of ideas does 
not strongly protect speech that calls to action, unless that action itself in 
some way involves debate or the propagation of a point of view. 
The Meiklejohnian theory of democratic self-governance protects the 
communicative processes that are necessary for citizens to make 
informed and intelligent voting decisions.203  This theory appears more 
protective of speech that calls people to action, since such calls are an 
important part of the process of democratic governance.  However, this 
interpretation would protect only that speech that calls for action related 
to self-governance.  Furthermore, Meiklejohn’s version of self-
governance interprets the First Amendment as shielding the public from 
the “mutilation of the thinking process of the community,”204 and 
requires the state to distinguish between abusive and non-abusive, and 
high and low value speech.205  If the call to action contains low value 
speech, or fails to contain high value speech, the state could justifiably 
intervene as neutral moderator to protect political process from abuse. 
An alternate version of democratic self-governance provides stronger 
and broader protection for a call to action.  American courts, in practice, 
often use what Post calls the “participatory” theory of democratic self-
governance, which focuses on the legitimization of democracy by 
protecting individual autonomy against regulations of public 
discourse.206  This theory protects individual engagement in public 
discussion unless the government can show significant harm.  Under this 
version of democratic self-governance, as long as the call to action in 
some way involves public discussion, it should receive protection, 
absent a showing of significant harm. 
The safety valve theory provides perhaps the most protection for 
advocacy of action.  As long as the action is not harmful, it should be 
protected as a way of allowing people to freely express themselves so 
 
 202. Post, supra note 196, at 2363–66. 
 203. Id. at 2367. 
 204. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE 
PEOPLE 26, 27 (1960) (emphasis omitted). 
 205. Post, supra note 196, at 2368. 
 206. Id. at 2369. 
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that they do not become frustrated with oppressive governance and 
revolt. 
A final, libertarian rationale argues that it does not matter whether 
theory provides a rationale for protecting speech.  The focus should be 
on not restricting the rights of individuals, arguing that “assuming 
no . . . danger, it is simply not appropriate for society to censor free and 
open discourse.”207 
Thus, under a marketplace of ideas theory and Meicklejohnian self-
governance theory, one would have to look at the value of the speech.  
But under Post’s participatory theory, the safety valve theory, and a 
libertarian rationale, what matters is not the value of the speech, but 
whether there is a significant harm that is worth preventing.  The latter 
three theories justify affording protection to most speech that incites 
action, absent a showing that a real and significant harm will occur.  The 
details of this protection—how serious the harm must be, how likely the 
speech is to actually cause that harm—are what the Supreme Court 
struggled with for decades, before alighting on the Brandenburg 
standard. 
B. First Amendment Theory and Assembly 
Freedom of assembly has an even more complicated relationship with 
First Amendment theory than incitement.208  C. Edwin Baker points out 
that First Amendment analysis is often based on a speech–conduct 
dichotomy that “immediately relegates assemblies, which are obviously 
conduct, to a lesser constitutional status than speech.”209  However, 
assembly itself is in fact directly protected by the First Amendment.  In 
part because of the speech-conduct dichotomy, this protection of 
assembly is hard to square with traditional First Amendment theories. 
Under the marketplace of ideas theory, some assemblies are important 
for expressing ideas, but most are not.  This is because assemblies occur 
for many reasons, few of them directly having to do with conversation 
or the propagation of specific ideas.  Thus, it is hard to link most 
assemblies with the pursuit of truth.  Therefore, most assemblies would 
not be protected under a traditional version of the marketplace of ideas.  
Generally, the focus of the marketplace of ideas rationale is on 
preventing censorship, so restrictions on assemblies that do not focus on 
content often appear constitutionally adequate.  This is why time, place, 
and manner restrictions that are content-neutral are generally accepted 
 
 207. Redish, supra note 201, at 1164. 
 208. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and 
Time, Place, and Manner Regulations, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 937 (1983). 
 209. Id. at 941. 
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by courts.210 
Meiklejohnians would almost certainly not see a value in strong 
protection for assemblies.  The important concern for Meiklejohn “is not 
that everyone shall get to speak, but that everything worth saying shall 
be said.”211  Thus, under this theory, assemblies can be restricted as long 
as alternate channels of communication are available. 
Under Post’s version of democratic self-governance, however, 
assemblies should achieve higher First Amendment protection.  
Assemblies go to the heart of democratic legitimacy because they create 
a forum through which government can be directly responsive to public 
discourse.  Restricting assemblies would restrict public discourse, and 
delegitimize government by preventing those with the least traditional 
access to governance from communicating.  The Supreme Court has 
used this rationale to protect freedom of assembly.212 The Supreme 
Court has also used the safety-valve rationale on multiple occasions to 
justify protection of freedom of assembly.  The Court has pointed out 
that if peaceful meetings cannot occur, revolution may result.213 
There is another way of understanding the First Amendment that 
provides protection to assemblies.  Jack Balkin theorizes that the First 
Amendment enables and protects cultural democracy; individuals should 
be able to participate in the culture that in turn defines them.214 
Assembly is one mode of participation in public culture. 
Before the internet, when the primary means of addressing the public 
was top-down media such as newspapers or television, public assembly 
was one of the few ways individuals could participate in the crafting of 
public culture.  The internet is in some ways the virtual version of 
physical assembly.  The Supreme Court in fact recognized this “street 
corner” aspect of online culture in Reno v. ACLU.215  Thus both in-
person and online assembly are particularly important if the goal of the 
 
 210. Id. at 944. 
 211. Meiklejohn, supra note 204, at 26. 
 212. See, e.g., Terminiello v. City of Chi., 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (observing that “it is only through 
free debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people and 
peaceful change is effected”). 
 213. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) (“The greater the importance of 
safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, 
the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press 
and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that 
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by 
peaceful means.  Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional 
government.”); see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912 (1982) (“Through 
speech, assembly, and petition—rather than through riot or revolution—petitioners sought to change a 
social order that had consistently treated them as second-class citizens.”). 
 214. See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
 215. See 521 U.S. 844, 854 (1997). 
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First Amendment is cultural democracy.  This is the case regardless of 
whether the assembly concerns high value or low value speech. 
Assemblies are also strongly protected under a theory of individual 
liberty.  “Any individual who is restricted—legally prevented from 
assembling—has her liberty abridged.”216  The collection of individuals 
in an assembly is protected by each individual’s right to assemble.217 
Baker theorizes six principles concerning assembly that stem from the 
theory of individual liberty.  Two of his principles are more pertinent to 
discussion of assembly as it relates to regulation of riot.  Baker explains 
that the government abridges freedom of assembly when it imposes 
restrictions that turn on the fact that the thing being regulated is an 
assembly.  Often, riot statutes are justified by the number of persons 
involved rather than secondary conduct that produces actual harm.  This 
suggests that, under Baker’s understanding of freedom of assembly, riot 
statutes that are justified based on numbers rather than actions are 
unconstitutional. 
Baker also discusses the nature of acceptably regulable activity in the 
context of freedom of assembly.  He explains that the government 
cannot outlaw the strategic disruption of everyday life just because it is a 
disruption.218  As part of the freedom of assembly, “people should have 
the right to use the peaceful presence of their bodies to interfere non-
violently with others’ everyday activities.”219  That interference is part 
of the power of freedom of assembly.220  Thus, even if the assembly 
“forcibly interfere[s] with others’ activities,” it should be protected as 
long as it is nonviolent.221  Baker draws the line at any physical attack 
on, destruction of, or injury to people or property.222 
Conduct that occurs while individuals are assembled should be 
subject to at least the same rules as individual conduct.  Thus, if a 
disorderly conduct or breach of the peace statute is unconstitutional as 
applied to individuals, it must also be unconstitutional as applied to an 
assembly.  Baker is correct that basing one’s regulation of crowds on the 
theory that multiple numbers causes bad things to happen goes against 
the idea of having a First Amendment right of assembly.  This is the 
 
 216. Baker, supra note 208, at 985. 
 217. Id. at 988–89. 
 218. Id. at 979. 
 219. Id. at 980. 
 220. Id. at 980 n.110 (“An important aspect of the right of assembly may be its protection of the 
power of people who feel oppressed and ignored to impose costs on government and society.  A key 
democratic feature of peaceable assemblies, as opposed to the instruments of violence, is that their 
capacity to cause disruption and inconvenience is directly related to the number of supporters and 
participants.”). 
 221. Id. at 981. 
 222. See id. at 982. 
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case even if one does not get into a discussion of the expressive value of 
assembly itself. 
This perspective would require courts addressing riot statutes to reject 
the inclusion in those statutes of lawful conduct done in an unlawful 
way.  It would also require courts to reject the regulation of spoken 
threats in riot statutes where they are not true threats.223  It is not clear 
how many riot statutes refer to threats as speech versus threats as 
conduct. 
If one cannot be arrested for waving one’s arms on a street, one 
should not be subject to arrest for waving one’s arms in the company of 
others.  Baker provides a similar example: if one cannot be arrested for 
walking down the street, one should not be able to be arrested for 
walking in tandem with three other people.224  If, however, one can be 
arrested for hitting somebody, one can be arrested for hitting somebody 
with three other people. 
The difficulty arises when what is involved is less tangible.  If one 
can be arrested for assault—for intentionally placing somebody in 
immediate apprehension of harmful bodily contact—one can be arrested 
for doing the same with three people.  But if the individual crime 
requires a showing of intent to cause apprehension, or an intent to do the 
act that causes apprehension, then the crime involving the group must 
require the same intent for each individual, and not disperse the intent 
across a group.  The group crime also cannot change the target of the 
threat to the general public rather than an individual.225  Allowing the 
public peace to be the target of the threat prevents the disruption that is 
an inherent part of the power of freedom of assembly.  When disruption 
is balanced against the right of assembly, the right of assembly should 
prevail. 
C. First Amendment Theory and Incitement to Riot 
Incitement to riot involves both incitement and assembly.  When 
speech is a call to assemble, regulators should be mindful of 
justifications for protecting both the call itself and the assembly, through 
protection of the call.  Across First Amendment theories, considerations 
of both individual autonomy and protection for larger political process 
 
 223. See generally Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
 224. Baker goes further than I find necessary to go, at least in this paper, and concludes that thus 
permits should not be required for parades.  See generally Baker, supra note 208. 
 225. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2903 (2012) (“A person commits riot if, with two or 
more other persons acting together, such person recklessly uses force or violence or threatens to use 
force or violence, if such threat is accompanied by immediate power of execution, which disturbs the 
public peace.”). 
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argue that calls to gather should be particularly protected under the First 
Amendment.  Protecting a call to gather legitimizes the political process 
by providing a forum for public discussion outside of existing political 
strictures.  It preserves individual autonomy against overzealous state 
regulation.  And it often directly (through advocacy) or indirectly 
(through the chosen venue of the protest or the size of the crowd) brings 
points of view into public discourse that otherwise would remain 
unexamined.  Like the internet—and often now with the aid of the 
internet—assembly enables participation in the formation of public 
culture by people who are not in possession of broadcast media. 
D. First Amendment Incitement Doctrine 
The previous Subpart addressed First Amendment theories for 
protecting incitement, assembly, and incitement to riot.  This Subpart 
addresses how courts have applied such theories, outlining existing First 
Amendment jurisprudence on incitement. 
Speech entwined with action presents one of the most challenging and 
well-known First Amendment problems.  The Supreme Court famously 
addressed incitement to unlawful action in Brandenburg v. Ohio, but the 
tortuous history of First Amendment jurisprudence on incitement up to 
that point indicates the difficulty of the problem. 
1. Incitement Before Brandenburg 
Before Brandenburg, the Supreme Court struggled with whether and 
how to protect speech that calls to action.  The basis of this struggle 
concerned just how likely and imminent the result of the speech must be 
for the speech to be regulable. 
The earliest incitement cases arose against widespread fear of the rise 
of Bolshevism in Russia.  In 1919, the Supreme Court addressed 
advocacy of illegal action in three cases: Schenck v. United States,226 
Frohwerk v. United States,227 and Debs v. United States.228  In Schenck, 
the Court famously reasoned that the First Amendment “would not 
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic,” 
and articulated the “clear and present danger” test, which allowed the 
government to prohibit speech that created a clear and present danger of 
a substantive evil Congress had a right to prevent.229 
In Frohwerk and Debs, the Court developed the “bad tendency” test, 
 
 226. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 227. 249 U.S. 204 (1919). 
 228. 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
 229. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
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which ignored the imminence of the bad action and looked instead to the 
speech’s “natural tendency and reasonably probable effects.”230  The 
Court applied this bad tendency test to uphold convictions in Abrams v. 
United States231 and Gitlow v. New York.232  In 1927, the Court in 
Whitney v. California used the bad tendency test to affirm the conviction 
of a member of the Communist Labor Party after that member signed a 
resolution.233 
As early as 1919, Justice Holmes observed significant problems with 
the bad tendency test and urged re-adoption of the clear and present 
danger test.234  Justice Brandeis’s concurrence in 1927 in Whitney also 
urged a return to assessing the immediacy of the danger incurred by the 
speech at issue.235 
In the 1930s and 1940s, it appeared that the Court might shift to the 
clear and present danger test.236  But in 1951, in Dennis v. United States, 
the Court retreated,237 proposing a balancing test of “whether the gravity 
of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of 
free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.”238  This test did not 
mention imminence of the action; the more ‘evil’ the speech was, the 
less the court needed to consider the probability of its actual occurrence.  
Justice Douglas dissented, reiterating the importance of imminence.239 
In Yates v. United States,240 the Court clarified that Dennis had not 
“obliterated the traditional dividing line between advocacy of abstract 
doctrine and advocacy of action.”241  However, the Court did not discuss 
whether imminence was required.242  
Several cases in the 1960s prefigured what is now the established 
doctrine on incitement.243 Then, in 1969, the Court held in Brandenburg 
v. Ohio that government may not restrict advocacy of illegal action 
unless it “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action 
 
 230. See Debs, 249 U.S. at 216. 
 231. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
 232. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
 233. See 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
 234. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627–30 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 235. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374–77 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 236. See, e.g., DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Herndon v. Lowrey, 301 U.S. 242 
(1937); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
 237. 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (plurality opinion). 
 238. Id. at 510. 
 239. See id. at 581–91. 
 240. 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
 241. Id. at 320. 
 242. See id. at 324–25. 
 243. See generally Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 
(1966); Watts v. United States., 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam). 
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and is likely to incite or produce such action.”244  
2. Brandenburg v. Ohio 
Brandenburg addressed the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader 
under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute.  Brandenburg addressed 
Ohio’s Criminal Syndicalism Act,245 which banned advocating “crime, 
violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing 
political reform” and banned gathering with the purpose of teaching 
criminal syndicalism.246   
The accused spoke at a rural Ku Klux Klan rally that was covered by 
a Cincinnati television station.  He stated to those assembled that “if our 
President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the 
white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be some 
revengeance taken.”247  He also announced a march on Congress. 
The Court held that the First Amendment protected this speech, 
explaining that the statute “purports to punish mere advocacy and to 
forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to 
advocate the described type of action.”248  The Court famously held that 
speech that advocates action cannot be regulated unless it “is directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action.”249 
Despite its conciseness, the Brandenburg test contains multiple 
elements.  It requires intent on the part of the speaker: the speech must 
be “directed to inciting” action.250  It requires that a listener be present 
who is able to clearly understand and follow through on the speaker’s 
intent.251  It dictates that the state can regulate such speech only when 
the possible action is both likely and imminent.  Thus, even if the 
speaker intends to incite action, and the listener understands that speech 
as incitement, the state cannot regulate the call to action unless the 
action is both imminent and likely to occur. 
Any statute regulating incitement to riot as incitement would have to 
address the speaker’s intent, how likely it is that an audience would 
understand that intent, the imminence of the action, and the likelihood of 
 
 244. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
 245. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (1919) (originally enacted as OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. 
§2923.56 (repealed 1974)). 
 246. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 456 n.3. 
 247. Id. at 446. 
 248. Id. at 449. 
 249. Id. at 447. 
 250. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (per curiam) (noting that speech cannot be 
regulated unless the speaker’s “words were intended to produce, and likely to produce” the outcome). 
 251. Id. at 107–09. 
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the occurrence of illegal activity. 
It appears at first glance that the Supreme Court’s analysis of 
incitement ends with Brandenburg and one case affirming it.252  In Hess 
v. Indiana, the appellant was convicted of disorderly conduct for 
shouting “[w]e’ll take the fucking street later” or “[w]e’ll take the 
fucking street again” at an antiwar demonstration.253  The Court held 
that since Hess’s statement was not directed to any person, it could not 
be incitement and was protected under the First Amendment.254  The 
Court emphasized the importance of the speaker’s intent, and the 
imminence and likelihood of illegal action.255 
3. Questions after Brandenburg 
Despite its clear language, Brandenburg leaves a number of doctrinal 
gaps.  There are at least four areas of tension in First Amendment 
jurisprudence that Brandenburg failed to clearly address.256  Three of 
these questions have direct relevance for any analysis of incitement-to-
riot statutes: how courts should treat indirect advocacy of unlawful 
action, what Brandenburg means by imminence, and what kind of 
substantive harm Brandenburg seeks to prevent. 
The Supreme Court has never addressed whether there should be a 
distinction between direct and indirect advocacy of unlawful action.257  
In Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, Judge Learned Hand insisted that 
only direct advocacy, where the speaker clearly urges the listener to do 
an unlawful act, should be punished.258  This view of advocacy would 
protect statements that might lead another to commit a crime but do not 
directly advocate it.  For example, a person shouting “the man in that 
jail tortured and killed my mother” in front of a mob outside a jail would 
be protected by the First Amendment under this view.259  The 
implication for incitement to riot is that if only direct advocacy may be 
banned, and the speaker calls for assembly but does not call for anything 
else to happen, then that speech would be protected regardless of 
whether riot ensues. 
Brandenburg does not clearly address whether the First Amendment 
grants heightened protection to indirect advocacy.  Brandenburg states 
 
 252. See id. 
 253. Id. at 107. 
 254. Id. at 108–09. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Redish, supra note 201, at 1176–78. 
 257. Id. at 1178. 
 258. See 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). 
 259. Redish, supra note 201, at 1179. 
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that unlawful incitement must be “directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action,” but it is not clear if “directed to” means that 
the speech must explicitly mention the specific unlawful act.260  It is 
unlikely that Brandenburg allows for regulation of only direct advocacy, 
however.  Brandenburg appears to focus, like previous Supreme Court 
cases, on the resulting harm.  Significant harm can emerge from 
intentional but indirect advocacy when it is directed to an audience that 
is likely to understand it as advocacy.261 
The second relevant doctrinal ambiguity that Brandenburg fails to 
resolve is what imminence means.  Does imminence mean that the act 
must occur within seconds?  Minutes?  Hours? 
Brandenburg’s imminence requirement may in fact be extremely 
temporally strict.262  When a person speaks to a crowd and moves that 
crowd to violence that police are unable to control, that person may be 
arrested for incitement to riot under Feiner v. New York.263  Feiner and 
subsequent cases suggest that the crowd must be excited, and the police 
must find the crowd uncontrollable, before the speaker can be arrested; 
therefore, merely speaking to the crowd is not enough to show 
imminence.  Feiner is still good law, and other courts that have referred 
to Feiner focus on the fact that members of the audience had begun 
voicing physical threats.264 
The most significant ambiguity in Brandenburg is whether the case 
allows government regulation of incitement to all “lawless action,” or 
only to significantly harmful or violent lawless action.  The problem 
emerges because Brandenburg balances free speech against protection 
from harm.  It cannot be the case that all unlawful acts produce the same 
amount of harm with respect to that balance.  Many relatively harmless 
acts can be illegal, such as jaywalking, or parading without a permit. 
In earlier versions of the clear and present danger test, it did not 
matter what the evil was, as long as Congress had the power to prevent 
it.265  But in Bridges v. California, the Court applied the clear and 
present danger test and stated that “the substantive evil must be 
extremely serious . . . before utterances can be punished.”266  In his 
concurrence in Whitney, Justice Brandeis wrote that “even imminent 
danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of those functions essential to 
 
 260. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 261. See, e.g., Susan Benesch, Vile Crime or Inalienable Right: Defining Incitement to Genocide, 
48 VA. J. INT’L L. 485 (2008). 
 262. See G. Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the 
Federal Criminal Law, 2002 B.Y.U. L. REV. 829, 874 n.133 (2002). 
 263. 340 U.S. 315 (1951). 
 264. See, e.g., Jones v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 57 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 265. Redish, supra note 201, at 1178. 
 266. 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941). 
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effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively 
serious.”267  The Court’s test in Dennis similarly examined the 
seriousness of the threatened harm.268 
It is unclear whether Brandenburg incorporates these previous 
observations that the incited action must be serious, in addition to 
unlawful.  However, in deference to the strength of First Amendment 
protection, the burden should be on those who want to establish that 
Brandenburg does not import the previously existing seriousness 
requirement.  The Brandenburg test itself refers to advocacy of the 
potentially broad category of “lawless action.”269  And the indictment in 
Brandenburg under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute was for 
advocating “crime” in addition to violence.270  
Even within Brandenburg, the Court suggests that the harm 
anticipated is more than just lawless action and includes an 
understanding that the action must be harmful or serious in addition to 
being unlawful.  In a footnote to the Brandenburg incitement test, the 
Court referred to its decision in Yates v. United States271  concerning the 
advocacy of the forcible overthrow of the government and tendency to 
produce “forcible” action rather than merely “lawless” action.272  And in 
the paragraph following the incitement test, the Court quoted Noto v. 
United States for the proposition that the advocacy of “force and 
violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and 
steeling it to such action.”273  These two references place the 
Brandenburg incitement test in the context of advocacy of force or 
violence, not advocacy of any small unlawful action Congress has 
chosen—and is permitted—to ban. 
Courts should thus interpret Brandenburg as containing the implicit 
requirement that “lawless action” be limited to serious lawless action.  
As Redish observes, “Society’s interest in suppressing speech is simply 
not as strong where the speech advocates only minor transgressions.”274  
Society should be more willing to risk speech suppression when the 
substantive evil being prevented involves force or violence, rather than 
illegally walking on the grass.275  Thus, for example, Brandenburg 
should not allow states to criminalize incitement to a permitless protest, 
 
 267. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377–78 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 268. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 542–46 (1951). 
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unless the permit requirements prevent a serious harm.  The harm 
caused by a permitless protest, except in rare exceptions, would likely 
be too de minimis for the state to be able to reach the speaker calling for 
the action, even if that action is imminent and likely to occur. 
E. First Amendment Doctrine on Assembly, and the Hostile Crowd 
Doctrine 
Incitement to riot is additionally restricted by the First Amendment’s 
protection of freedom of assembly: the right of the people to peaceably 
assemble.  What that freedom means, however, is surprisingly 
underexplored. 
The Supreme Court has most often addressed freedom of assembly 
with respect to time, place, and manner regulations.  However, riot 
statutes deal with disruption of public order; not time, place, and manner 
regulations.  They are unusual in this regard, because they combine 
elements of disorderly conduct statutes with targeting assembly.276 
The difficulty with riot statutes arises because of a difficulty inherent 
in the right of assembly: assemblies are never merely communicative, 
but occupy a physical space.  Baker explains that communication is only 
one aspect of assembly: “People assemble and associate in order to 
generate and exercise power, to do things, to engage in activities that are 
valued in themselves, to engage in activities that often give the people 
involved an exhilarating sense of power and self-actualization, and to 
engage in the extraordinary as a way to challenge and change the 
ordinary and the routine.”277 
Baker thus suggests, and I agree, that restrictions on the right of 
assembly must be narrow, in appreciation for all of the conduct that 
assembly rightfully contains.  Restriction on assembly can and should be 
limited as much as possible to preventing actual or attempted force and 
violence.278   
Whether the Supreme Court agrees with this is a difficult question to 
answer.  It turns on how one understands “peaceable” assembly: as all 
conduct that is nonviolent, or conduct that is orderly, calm, and 
nondisruptive.  These are two very different understandings of the term 
“peaceable.” Which one courts choose will have extraordinary 
implications for freedom of assembly. 
The closest the Supreme Court has come to analysis in this area is its 
creation of the hostile crowd doctrine, which suggests that peaceable 
means nonviolent, not nondisruptive.  The hostile crowd doctrine 
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suggests that when a speaker causes a crowd to react, regulation cannot 
occur until that crowd is in fact stirred to actual violence.  The Court in 
fact explicitly connected hostile crowd doctrine to freedom of assembly 
in the 1992 case of Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement.279 
1. Freedom of Assembly 
Freedom of assembly has a fairly long doctrinal history.  As early as 
1937, the Court in De Jonge explained that states could not punish 
“mere participation in a peaceable assembly and lawful public 
discussion.”280  However, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, an early fighting 
words case, the Court noted that the state may regulate the time and 
manner of solicitation “in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort or 
convenience.”281  The Court stated that the state is permitted to regulate 
when clear and present danger of riot, disorder, or interference with 
traffic upon the public streets appears.282 
The Court’s usual discussion of freedom of assembly has been about 
time, place, and manner, and alternate channels of communication.283  I 
do not intend to review that analysis here.  Because the focus of this 
paper is on the regulation of riot, this Subpart examines the scope of 
First Amendment protection for activity once an assembly has 
convened. 
In 1949, in Cole v. Arkansas, the Court addressed an Arkansas 
unlawful assembly statute and suggested, but explicitly did not decide, 
that the First Amendment freedom of assembly might protect 
assembling peaceably even when somebody else in the group commits 
violence.284  The Court explicitly found that it was constitutional for a 
state to convict a person of “promoting, encouraging and aiding an 
assemblage the purpose of which is to wreak violence.”285 
In Feiner, the Court considered the boundary at which police might 
interfere with a crowd’s behavior.  The Court upheld Feiner’s conviction 
of disorderly conduct for breach of the peace where the crowd he 
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addressed had grown “restless and there was some pushing, shoving and 
milling around.”286 Even though the Court continuously references 
incitement to riot, Feiner was in fact convicted of disorderly conduct, a 
different offense.  Feiner spoke from a loudspeaker on top of a car and 
urged his crowd to “rise up in arms and fight for equal rights.”287  At 
least one person in the crowd threatened violence, and Feiner twice 
refused to stop speaking when an officer requested that he stop. 
The Court was explicit that Feiner was arrested not because of the 
officers’ views of his speech, but because his speech “actually 
engendered” a dangerous reaction by the crowd.288  The Court cited 
Cantwell for the proposition that “[w]hen clear and present danger of 
riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other 
immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of 
the State to prevent or punish is obvious.”289 
The Court noted in Feiner that speech to a crowd is protected only up 
to a point.  When “the speaker passes the bounds of argument or 
persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot,” police may intercede “to 
prevent a breach of the peace.”290  Judge Frankfurter wrote a concurring 
opinion that the police had “interfered only when they apprehended 
imminence of violence.”291  But the majority opinion in Feiner appears 
to grant the state broad latitude for regulating crowd behavior when it 
threatens the public safety, peace, or order. 
Fourteen years later, however, in Edwards v. South Carolina, the 
Court moved away from this deferential position and protected orderly 
protests when the state’s interest was not as high.  The Court overturned 
a conviction for common law breach of the peace, where civil rights 
protesters walked single file or two abreast “in an orderly way,” caused 
no obstruction of traffic, and threatened no violence.292  Explaining that 
a state cannot “make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular 
views,”293 the Court examined South Carolina’s definition of “breach of 
the peace” and found it to be unconstitutionally broad.  The march had 
not produced “violence or threat of violence on their part, or on the part 
of any member of the crowd watching them.”294 
Two years later, in Cox v. Louisiana, the Court addressed another 
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protest case.295  Cox had led some 2000 students protesting against 
discrimination and segregation to assemble peaceably at the state capitol 
building.  He was convicted of three offenses under state law: disturbing 
the peace, obstructing public passages, and picketing before a 
courthouse.  Cox had told officers “that they would march by the 
courthouse, say prayers, sing hymns, and conduct a peaceful program of 
protest;”296 an officer twice asked him to disband, and he refused.  The 
protest was held 101 feet from the courthouse and did not obstruct the 
street.  The Sheriff tolerated the protest until Cox appealed to students to 
sit in at segregated lunch counters.  This call prompted “muttering” and 
“grumbling” by white onlookers.297  
The Court found that there had been no indication the students had 
ever been hostile, aggressive, unfriendly, or “disorderly;”298 and that 
while the atmosphere of the white audience had become “tense,” there 
was no indication that any member of the white group threatened 
violence.299  This made the situation a “far cry from the situation in 
Feiner.”300  The Court thus found Louisiana’s disturbing the peace 
statute unconstitutionally broad and impinging on Cox’s rights of free 
speech and free assembly.  Citing Terminiello, the Court concluded that 
speech must be protected even “when it induces a condition of unrest, 
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to 
anger.”301 
The next case to address assembly was Brandenburg itself.  In 
Brandenburg, the statute banned gathering with purposes of teaching 
criminal syndicalism.  The Court found it was unconstitutional “to 
forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to 
advocate the described type of action.”302 
After Brandenburg was decided in 1969, the Court continued to 
address issues of crowd regulation.  Two years later, in Coates v. City of 
Cincinnati, the Court found a Cincinnati ordinance unconstitutionally 
violative of freedom of assembly and association when it criminalized 
the assembly of three or more persons on a sidewalk conducting 
themselves “in a manner annoying to persons passing by.”303  The Court 
explained that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and 
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overbroad because “[c]onduct that annoys some people does not annoy 
others.”304  While the city could prevent people from blocking 
sidewalks, obstructing traffic, littering, committing assaults, or other 
behavior, it must do so through specific ordinances.  The Court 
concluded that past decisions “establish that mere public intolerance or 
animosity cannot be the basis for abridgment of these constitutional 
freedoms.”305 
The classic case cited for protection of freedom of assembly, NAACP 
v. Claiborne, is actually rather conservative in its holding when 
compared to some of the earlier cases.306  Cole had already suggested in 
1949 that peaceable assembly might be protected where somebody else 
in a group, but not the accused, committed violence.  The Court in 
NAACP held that a speaker, Charles Evers, could not be held liable for 
damages created by other people in a Mississippi boycott of several 
hundred people that lasted for several years.  The Court carefully 
emphasized the political nature of the assembly, observing that 
“expression on public issues has always rested on the highest rung of the 
hierarchy of First Amendment values.”307  It acknowledged repeatedly 
that while political assembly is protected, violence is not.308  Then, it 
noted the attenuation between Evers’s speech and any acts of violence, 
which occurred “weeks or months” after his speech.309 
None of these conclusions add to the existing doctrine on when crowd 
action moves outside of being “peacable” and may be regulated.  Where 
NAACP does add doctrine is its evidentiary requirements that when an 
individual is accused on the basis of actions by other people in the same 
group, “it is necessary to establish that the group itself possessed 
unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific intent to further 
those illegal aims.”310  
More recent cases address the scope of acceptable restrictions on 
gatherings.  In 1988, in Boos v. Barry, the Court found unconstitutional 
a District of Columbia statute banning display of signs bringing foreign 
government into disrepute within 500 feet of an embassy.311  Buried 
within this case, which found direct regulation of the signs 
unconstitutional, the Court found the “congregation clause” of the 
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statute constitutional.312  This finding altered what until then looked like 
a clear rule that breach of the peace statutes were generally 
unconstitutional. 
The “congregation clause” in Boos allowed police to arrest 
individuals for failure to disperse a congregation of three or more people 
standing within 500 feet of an embassy.  The Court held that the original 
statute was problematic because it “applies to any congregation within 
500 feet of an embassy for any reason and because it appears to place no 
limits at all on the dispersal authority of the police.”313  However, the 
Court of Appeals had narrowed the congregation clause to apply “only 
when the police reasonably believe that a threat to the security or peace 
of the embassy is present.”314  This narrowing of the statute to “groups 
posing a security threat” and the fact that the congregation clause was 
“site specific” to within 500 feet of an embassy made it constitutional 
and not vague, unlike the earlier breach of the peace statutes rejected in 
other cases.315 
After Boos, then, it is clear that not all breach of the peace statutes are 
unconstitutional.  It remains unclear, however, where the dividing line is 
between sufficiently tailored breach of the peace statutes and 
unconstitutional infringements on the freedom of assembly. 
2. Hostile Crowd Doctrine 
The line between peaceful assembly and violent behavior is not 
clearly drawn in freedom of assembly cases.  However, another line of 
related doctrine provides additional guidance.  Although the Supreme 
Court has not addressed incitement to riot, its doctrine on the regulation 
of crowds that grow hostile towards a speaker is instructive.  The 
“hostile crowd doctrine” addresses when police might step in to prevent 
a crowd that is hostile to a speaker from boiling over into violence.  The 
Supreme Court has declared that it is unconstitutional to stop a speaker 
because the audience is becoming hostile, unless the crowd actually 
becomes violent or disorderly.  The same boundary might be applied to 
incitement to riot. 
In 1949, in Terminiello v. City of Chicago, the Court emphatically 
declared that it was unconstitutional to convict a speaker of breach of 
the peace for speech that “stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, 
brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance . . . .”316  
 
 312. Id. at 313. 
 313. Id. at 330. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. at 331. 
 316. 337 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1949). 
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Terminiello, which protected an anti-Semitic speaker to the Christian 
Veterans of America, laid the groundwork for a number of later cases 
holding that governments may not try to predict an audience’s reaction 
when choosing to regulate speech, or let a hostile audience determine 
when a speaker should be shut down.  Instead, states must wait until 
disorder or violence in fact arises. 
As discussed, only two years later in Feiner, the Court upheld a 
conviction of disorderly conduct for breach of the peace where the 
crowd had grown “restless and there was some pushing, shoving and 
milling around.”317  However, in Edwards v. South Carolina, the Court 
found that where a civil rights march had not produced “violence or 
threat of violence on their part, or on the part of any member of the 
crowd watching them,” the speech was protected by the First 
Amendment and was thus distinguishable from the situation in 
Feiner.318  This later reading of Feiner appears to restrict its holding to 
violent and imminently violent behavior. 
The most recent relevant Supreme Court case on crowd behavior is 
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement in 1992.319  Forsyth combined 
an assembly case—concerning a parade permit—with hostile crowd 
doctrine.  In Forsyth, the Court considered a facial challenge to an 
ordinance allowing a permit administrator to adjust the fee of a parade 
permit.  The Court found the statute to be overbroad because it 
impermissibly delegated authority to the administrator.  The Court found 
that the statute was not content-neutral because the administrator could 
adjust the permit fee based on his guess that the crowd might react more 
heavily to a given protest.320  The relevance to incitement to riot is that 
Forsyth affirmed that “[s]peech cannot be . . . burdened . . . simply 
because it might offend a hostile mob.”321  This reiterates the earlier 
holdings in Terminiello, Edwards, and Cox. 
As Part IV of this article discussed, state riot statutes prohibit a 
variety of crowd behavior, some of which is attenuated from any actual 
violence to persons or harm to property.  The riot statutes themselves 
might not be constitutional.  But more significantly, when the Supreme 
Court has examined the relationship between a person addressing a 
crowd and bad behavior by that crowd, it has emphasized that the crowd 
must do more than merely exhibit anger or hostility for that speech to be 
 
 317. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 317 (1951). 
 318. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963). 
 319. 505 U.S. 123 (1992).  Note that while it might appear that Snyder v. Phelps would have 
addressed these issues, that case was concerned with whether the speech was about a matter of public 
concern, and defamation liability, not crowd reaction.  See generally Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 
(2011). 
 320. Forsyth Cnty., 505 U.S. at 134. 
 321. Id. at 134–35. 
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constitutionally regulable. 
The next subpart extrapolates from the above cases to create a 
framework for evaluating the constitutionality of incitement-to-riot 
statutes that ban incitement to action that does not rise to actual 
violence. 
3. Summary of Doctrine on Freedom of Assembly and Hostile Crowds 
The Court’s case law recognizes that sometimes a large gathering of 
people is constitutionally protected, while at other times a crowd’s 
behavior takes it outside the scope of that protection.  From these cases, 
the following rules emerge. 
It is clearly unacceptable for a statute to regulate purely peaceful 
assembly for political purposes.322  More generally, it is unacceptable to 
regulate the “peaceful expression of unpopular views,” whether or not 
those views are political in nature.323 
On the other hand, it is clearly acceptable for a statute to regulate 
violence or incitement to violence.324  Regulation of force that causes 
damage is probably analogously permissible.325 
When speech produces reactions falling between violence and peace, 
regulation is more complicated.  On the one hand, it is unconstitutional 
for a state to regulate speech because it (1) offends dignity,326 (2) is 
outrageous,327 (3) “stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or 
brought about a condition of unrest,”328 or (4) annoys.329 These 
standards for regulating speech are unconstitutional because they are 
inherently subjective, and it is important to have “adequate breathing 
space” for freedoms protected by the First Amendment.330  
But these categories of regulations are also unconstitutional because 
there is a sense that the underlying reaction to the speech is just not 
harmful enough.  In other words, “mere public intolerance or animosity 
cannot be the basis for abridgment of these constitutional freedoms.”331  
 
 322. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 363–65 (1937); NAACP v. Claiborne, 458 U.S. 886, 
913 (1982). 
 323. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963). 
 324. See, e.g., id. at 236 (“There was no violence or threat of violence on their part, or on the part 
of any member of the crowd watching them.”).  See also Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 933 (“The use of 
speeches, marches, and threats of social ostracism cannot provide the basis for a damages award.  But 
violent conduct is beyond the pale of constitutional protection.”). 
 325. See Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 933. 
 326. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988). 
 327. Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 556 (1988). 
 328. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5934 (1949). 
 329. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971). 
 330. Boos, 485 U.S. at 322. 
 331. Coates, 402 U.S. at 615. 
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Here, the Supreme Court presents more muddled doctrine.  A threat 
to public order may be acceptably regulated if it is crafted for a 
particular site or context that makes clear what activities are being 
disrupted.332  But at the same time, the Court has recognized a number 
of times that that common-law breach of the peace is too broad.333  In 
Cox, the Court appeared to contrast violence with well-controlled and 
orderly crowd behavior, suggesting that only violence or a threat of 
violence may be regulated, and that orderly and well-controlled crowds 
should be protected.334  There is presumably a category of disorderly 
conduct that slips between these two poles, and it is not clear whether 
freedom of assembly protects the behavior that is not violent but also is 
not orderly. 
This struggle to define the scope of regulable activity that results as a 
reaction to speech is highly pertinent to analysis of incitement-to-riot 
statutes.  Many state statutes penalize “violence” that does not cause 
actual injury, suggesting that they penalize crowd disorder rather than 
violence in a physical sense.  Some statutes penalize a threat of force 
that causes a threat to public peace.335 
The appropriate way to resolve this question is to err on the side of 
protecting speech.  Because Brandenburg is founded on balancing free 
speech against the State’s interest in protecting other citizens, it should 
apply only to incitement to lawless action that causes some kind of 
serious harm.  Incitement to, say, jaywalking should be protected by the 
First Amendment and not be subject to a Brandenburg test for 
determining whether the lawless action is imminent and likely to 
happen. 
More recent analysis of the 1951 incitement-to-riot case, Feiner, 
supports the view that Brandenburg requires that the speech produce 
serious harm.  Even though Feiner contemplated an immediate threat of 
“riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other 
immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order,” courts have since 
interpreted it as applying primarily to incitement of violence.336  
The Second Circuit, for example, described Feiner as a public 
gathering that “threatened to escalate into racial violence,” where the 
 
 332. Boos, 485 U.S. at 332 (finding the disturbance of public peace statute in Grayned acceptable 
because “[i]t is crafted for a particular context and given that context, it is apparent that the ‘prohibited 
quantum of disturbance’ is whether normal embassy activities have been or are about to be disrupted”). 
 333. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 526 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 
(1965). 
 334. Cox, 379 U.S. at 550 (noting that the crowd had “rumblings” and atmosphere became “tense” 
because of the “mutterings” “grumbling” and “jeering” from the white group, but “[t]here is no 
indication, however, that any member of the white group threatened violence”). 
 335. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-104 (2009). 
 336. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951). 
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speaker was arrested not only because of the crowd’s threatened 
violence but because he defied police orders to cease and desist.337  The 
Tenth Circuit explained that in Feiner the speaker urged that his black 
audience “rise up in arms and fight.”338 And a Kentucky district court 
recently explicitly linked incitement to riot to incitement to violence, 
explaining that “the Court must also consider the context of the speech 
to determine whether it was inherently likely to cause a violent reaction, 
thus inciting a riot.”339 
Thus Feiner can be read through Brandenburg to allow the state to 
arrest a speaker who incites imminent, likely, and serious violent action.  
But it would not mean that the state can arrest a speaker who incites 
imminent, likely and merely lawless action where that lawless action is 
something de minimis such as jaywalking. 
Even if one is not convinced by this argument and finds Brandenburg 
to apply to all lawless action, it cannot be the case that incitement to a 
threat or risk is constitutional.  The Supreme Court has required on 
numerous occasions some actual reaction from the crowd, not a risk of a 
reaction, for speech to a crowd to be regulated.  Brandenburg might 
alternatively mean that states can regulate direct incitement to 
jaywalking where jaywalking is imminent and likely, but it cannot mean 
that states can constitutionally regulate direct incitement to a risk of 
jaywalking where a risk of jaywalking is imminent.  The Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence on balancing the First Amendment against a risk 
of harm requires that police be able to immediately assess the harm on 
the ground, not predict what harm might occur in the future.340 Giving 
police the discretion to assess future harm caused by speech increases 
the likelihood that speech will be banned based on preexisting 
prejudices against its content. 
VI. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RIOT AND INCITEMENT TO RIOT 
A number of incitement-to-riot statutes are unconstitutional.  Some 
violate freedom of assembly in their underlying definition of “riot,” by 
defining riot as a risk of public alarm through tumultuous and violent 
conduct.  Others violate the First Amendment’s protection of speech that 
incites action, by failing to include the Brandenburg requirements.  
Those requirements, however, might be read into a statute by a court—
and many courts, in fact, have at least read a clear and present danger 
 
 337. Jones v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 57 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 338. Cannon v. City. of Denver, 998 F.2d 867, 873 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 339. World Wide St. Preachers’ Fellowship v. City of Owensboro, 342 F. Supp. 2d 634, 639 
(W.D. Ky. 2004). 
 340. Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 134. 
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test into incitement-to-riot statutes.  Third, a number of state statutes 
create a scheme where the call to action is remote from any actual harm.  
I have called this problem harm attenuation, and believe it cannot be 
constitutional under Brandenburg, both because sometimes the harm is 
too remote (not imminent) and because sometimes the anticipated harm 
is de minimis (not actual violence or force). 
A. When Riot Violates Freedom of Assembly 
There are two types of underlying riot statutes that might directly 
violate freedom of assembly.  The first concerns the creation of a risk of 
public alarm, and the second contains threats of violence rather than 
actual violence. 
1. Tumultuous Conduct and Public Alarm 
The first type of statute that may violate freedom of assembly is the 
type that penalizes creating a risk of public alarm through tumultuous 
conduct.  One example of this type is Arkansas’s riot statute, which 
penalizes riot if a person, with two or more other persons, knowingly 
engages in “tumultuous or violent conduct” that creates a “substantial 
risk” of “causing public alarm.”341  Where courts have not narrowed 
“tumultuous or violent conduct” to apply only to actual violence, this 
definition is probably unconstitutional. 
Regulating group conduct based on anticipated public animus is 
likely unconstitutional for two reasons.  First, it bases the evaluation of 
harm on public reaction rather than objective harm.  In Coates, the 
Supreme Court concluded that “mere public intolerance or animosity 
cannot be the basis for abridgment of these constitutional freedoms.”342  
Similarly, in Terminiello, the Court declared that it was unconstitutional 
to convict a speaker of breach of the peace for speech that “stirs the 
public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or 
creates a disturbance . . . .”343  Thus, it is probably unconstitutional to 
base a riot statute on banning the creation of “public alarm.”  Conduct 
that disturbs or alarms the public is often an element of assembly, and 
may even be an important part of the freedom to assemble. 
Second, because this type of statute is based on the risk of public 
alarm rather than the actual creation of public alarm, it allows police the 
discretion to determine whether the public will in fact be alarmed 
instead of proving that a person has, in fact, been alarmed.  Giving 
 
 341. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-201(a)(1) (2012). 
 342. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971). 
 343. Terminiello v. City of Chi., 337 U.S. 1, 3 (1949). 
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police the discretion to predict how a crowd might react is not 
appropriate and is likely unconstitutional.  In Forsyth, the Supreme 
Court found that the administrator could not be given the discretion to 
adjust a permit fee based on his guess that the crowd might react more 
heavily to a given protest.344  
Riot statutes that are founded on tumultuous conduct with no 
requirement that the conduct actually harm somebody or something, and 
with the only harm described being a risk of public alarm, are likely 
unconstitutionally violative of the freedom of assembly. 
The 1985 American Law Report annotation on incitement to riot 
noted a pattern in court interpretations of public alarm statutes: where 
force or violence has not in fact occurred, courts have found terror to the 
populace to be a necessary element of the crime of riot.345  Unless public 
terror and public alarm are construed to include an act of violence or 
physical harm, or to be physically limited to a specific site,346 this type 
of definition of riot is likely unconstitutional. 
2. Threats of Violence 
A second type of riot statute that might present problems for freedom 
of assembly is the kind that addresses threats of violence, rather than 
violence itself.  This presents a more difficult problem than statutes that 
penalize merely causing public alarm, because real violence is at least 
part of the equation.  An example of this kind of statute is Arizona’s riot 
statute, which penalizes a threat of force or violence that disturbs the 
public peace when that threat is accompanied by immediate power of 
execution.347  As mentioned, an Arizona court found this definition 
neither vague nor overbroad.348  
The question presented by this statute is whether “peaceable 
assembly” means assembly that is not violent, or assembly that does not 
even threaten violence.  This conflict stems from defining riot as a group 
version of the crime of assault.  Presumably, if one may arrest an 
individual for assault, one may arrest a group for assault.  Assault is 
usually defined as intentionally placing a person in apprehension of 
 
 344. Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992).  
 345. McMahon, supra note 8, § 3[a]. 
 346. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 331 (1988). 
 347. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2903 (2012) (“A person commits riot if, with two or more other 
persons acting together, such person recklessly uses force or violence or threatens to use force or 
violence, if such threat is accompanied by immediate power of execution, which disturbs the public 
peace.”). 
 348. See State v. Urias 553 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976). 
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immediate harmful or offensive contact.349  Arizona’s riot statute 
imports at least one element of assault by requiring the threat of violence 
to be followed by an immediate power of execution. 
However, this restriction alone is inadequate.  Arizona’s riot statute 
does not require a target for the threat of force or violence; it merely 
states that the threat of force or violence must disturb the public peace.  
This shift of the target of the threat from an individual who is in 
apprehension of imminent harmful conduct, to the “public peace” which 
risks getting disturbed, makes the statute possibly unconstitutional for 
the same reasons discussed above: states cannot ban speech that causes 
mere public animosity (even where that animosity is stirred up by a 
threat of violence), and states cannot ban speech based on a prediction 
of the public reaction to it without examining the facts on the ground.  
The definition of riot based on public annoyance, disturbance, or alarm 
again must be unconstitutional under Coates.350  Additionally, this type 
of riot statute might not meet the First Amendment standard for “true 
threats,” where the threat concerned involves speech rather than physical 
action.  In Virginia v. Black, the Supreme Court created a standard for 
“true threats,” which occur where the speaker “directs a threat to a 
person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear 
of bodily harm or death.”  The speaker need not actually intend to cause 
the harm.  This type of riot statute, however, does not have a victim or 
group of victims, and does not include an intent requirement or a 
threshold of harm. 
A related Supreme Court case on threats also suggests that this type 
of statute violates freedom of assembly.  In Boos, the Court allowed 
police to arrest assemblies “only when the police reasonably believe that 
a threat to the security or peace of the embassy is present.”351  But the 
Court’s reasoning in Boos suggests that two additional elements must be 
present for a threat-based statute to not violate freedom of assembly.  
First, the statute was narrowed to “groups posing a security threat to the 
embassy,” which is a more precise physical target than the amorphous 
“public peace.”  Second, the congregation clause was “site specific” to 
within 500 feet of an embassy, which made it not vague and thus 
constitutional.352  Arizona’s threat-based definition of riot is not site-
specific, and does not contain an individual target, just the public peace. 
 
 349. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining “assault” as the “threat or use of force 
on another that causes that person to have a reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive 
contact; the act of putting another person in reasonable fear or apprehension of an immediate battery by 
means of an act amounting to an attempt or threat to commit a battery”). 
 350. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971). 
 351. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 317 (1988). 
 352. Id. at 331. 
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Notably, New Hampshire courts recognize that this type of statute 
was problematic, and read into their similar statute a requirement that 
the crowd intentionally embark on concerted criminal action.353 
B. Brandenburg and Incitement to Riot: The Definition of Incitement 
Under Brandenburg, any incitement-to-riot statute would have to 
address the speaker’s intent, the likelihood that an audience would 
understand the speech, the imminence of the action, and the likelihood 
that the illegal activity would occur. 
Kentucky’s incitement-to-riot statute fails to include any definition of 
the term “incitement,” and thus fails on its face to include the 
requirements under the First Amendment.354  There is no mention of 
imminence, likelihood, or intent. 
A number of courts have recognized this problem, and interpreted 
“incitement” to include a clear and present danger test.  For those courts, 
however, the addition may still be inadequate because it does not fully 
import Brandenburg.355  The clear and present danger test does not 
discuss the connection between the speaker and the listener.  If the 
speaker speaks hastily and a crazy listener happens to act on that speech, 
the clear and present danger test might still allow the speaker to be 
penalized.  But the Brandenburg test requires that the speaker’s speech 
itself be understandable as incitement, and be likely to cause the action. 
C. Brandenburg and Incitement to Riot: The Attenuation Problem 
The third constitutionality problem with incitement-to-riot statutes is 
admittedly the most challenging to address.  Where riot is defined not as 
force and violence, but as a threat of tumultuous conduct, I believe that 
incitement to riot is too removed from actual harm to be constitutional.  
Rather than creating a likelihood of imminent harm, the speaker creates 
a likelihood of an imminent threat of conduct that itself in turn creates a 
clear and present danger of actual harm.  This scheme represents a 
nesting of speech–act prohibitions, each of which has to be closely 
examined for constitutionality.  It likely sweeps in a wide range of First 
Amendment-protected activity, without the justification that state action 
is needed to protect some person or thing from harm.  One should 
therefore not be criminally punished for inciting somebody to in turn 
merely create a risk or a threat (unless, arguably, that threat is a “true 
 
 353. State v. Albers 303 A.2d 197, 201 (N.H. 1973) (decided under prior law). 
 354. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.040(1) (2012). 
 355. See, e.g., People v. Upshaw, 741 N.Y.S.2d 664 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2002). 
59
Kaminski: Incitement to Riot
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013
60 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
threat” under Virginia v. Black).356 
This attenuation problem creates unconstitutional statutory schemes 
for two reasons: the harm is both de minimis and too remote.  Where the 
harm is itself a risk, it does not reach Brandenburg’s implicit 
requirement of serious lawless action—not just lawless action.  Just as 
one should not be criminalized for inciting somebody to jaywalk, even if 
the jaywalking is likely to occur, one should not be criminalized for 
inciting somebody to create a risk of harm or risk of public alarm.  One 
is inciting somebody to create a risk—not the harm itself.  
The second reason is that the harm is too remote, being doubly 
attenuated from the speech.  The speaker does not himself pose a threat 
of force and violence; the speaker merely poses a threat of creating, in 
turn, a threat of force and violence.  Several Supreme Court cases 
mention attenuation as a problem.  In NAACP, the court noted the 
attenuation between Evers’s speech and any acts of violence, which 
occurred “weeks or months” after his speech.357  Because of the 
attenuation, the violence was not sufficiently connected to the speech.  
Also, attenuation gives too much discretion to the police to determine 
when a risk might occur.  As mentioned, in Forsyth, the Court found 
that an administrator could not adjust the permit fee based on an in-
advance guess that a crowd might react strongly.358 
Under Brandenburg, imminence is a requirement of incitement.  It 
cannot be the case that one can be penalized as a speaker for creating an 
imminent threat of an imminent harm.  The double imminence does not 
itself add up to imminence, because it adds in a layer of time.  If a 
person tweets “gather in Times Square,” the state should not be able to 
punish that speech because the state assesses both that the speech is 
likely to create an imminent gathering and that a gathering in Times 
Square itself is likely to create imminent harm.  The state should be 
permitted to penalize the speech only when the speech itself, not the 
gathering created by the speech, is intended and likely to cause 
imminent harm. 
Courts appear to have noticed this attenuation problem, as well, as a 
number of states have developed case law that restricts these definitions.  
In Arkansas, the court in Chapman v. State read the statute to prohibit 
incitement to riot only where there was a clear, present, and immediate 
 
 356. This analysis may change if the threat is a “true threat,” under Virginia v. Black, where the 
“speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence 
to a particular individual or group of individuals” and intends to place the victim “in fear of bodily harm 
or death.”  538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003). 
 357. NAACP v. Claiborne, 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982). 
 358. Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992). 
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danger of acts of force or violence.359  Tennessee construes incitement 
as covering only conduct directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and thus found it not overbroad.360  And Kentucky, while 
lacking related case law, is guided by a 1974 legislative commentary on 
the incitement statute which clarifies that riot is “intended to be applied 
to disorderly demonstrations which threaten harm and which clearly 
exceed the limits of free expression.”  However, the fact that Kentucky 
bases its definition of riot on the threat of harm preserves the problem of 
incitement to riot based on a risk-of-harm standard rather than an actual 
harm standard. 
D. Incitement to Riot Under the Federal Anti-Riot Act 
As discussed in the previous Subpart, the Federal Anti-Riot Act does 
not ban riot itself, or, strictly speaking, incitement to riot.  It does, 
however, ban travel or the use of interstate commerce, including the 
mail, with intent to incite a riot, and an overt act done for that 
purpose.361  Thus, using Twitter to communicate between states with the 
intent to incite riot could be a violation of the Federal Anti-Riot Act.  
Incitement to riot is not further defined under the statute, although it is 
limited by § 2101(b) to not include “the mere oral or written (1) 
advocacy of ideas or (2) expression of belief, not involving advocacy of 
any act or acts of violence or assertion of the rightness of, or the right to 
commit, any such act or acts.”362 
Again, Brandenburg requires (1) intent by the speaker; (2) the 
existence of a listener who would understand the speech as inciting the 
action;363 (3) the likelihood that the action will happen; and (4) the 
imminence of the action.364  The Anti-Riot Act states that the speaker 
must intend to incite a riot.365  It contains no mention, however, of the 
existence of a listener, any likelihood that the riot will happen, or 
imminence of harm. 
Like some of the state laws examined above, the Anti-Riot Act 
defines riot in a way that creates another layer of First Amendment 
concerns.  Riot is federally defined as a public disturbance involving an 
assemblage of three or more persons, with a threat of the commission of 
 
 359. Chapman v. State, 516 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Ark. 1974). 
 360. Original Fayette Cnty. Civic & Welfare League, Inc. v. Ellington, 309 F. Supp. 89, 94 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1970). 
 361. 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (2011). 
 362. 18 U.S.C. § 2102(b) (2011). 
 363. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam). 
 364. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969). 
 365. 18 U.S.C. § 2101(b). 
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an act of violence.366  Thus, the Anti-Riot Act resembles those state laws 
that penalize incitement of an assembly that itself in turn threatens 
violence.  This, again, means that the call for riot can be a step away 
from actual harm, and that additional step of threat can be a second 
instance of speech. 
Where the Anti-Riot Act does define riot in terms of violence, it 
includes violence that creates the danger of damage, rather than actual 
damage.  The federal version of riot presents the same problems raised 
in some state laws: the speaker calling for a riot may be creating an 
imminent, likely riot, but not imminent or likely harm. 
E. Constitutionality of the Federal Anti-Riot Act 
A number of courts have considered the constitutionality of the Anti-
Riot Act.  The Seventh Circuit considered it twice, first before 
Brandenburg in National Mobilization Committee to End the War in 
Viet Nam v. Foran,367 and then several years later in United States v. 
Dellinger.368 A district court in the Northern District of California 
considered its constitutionality in In re Shead,369 but the Ninth Circuit in 
Carter v. United States decided that the appellants from In re Shead did 
not have standing to challenge the statute’s constitutionality.370  A 
district court in D.C., referring to these other cases, cursorily held that 
the statute was constitutional.371  For our purposes, the two Seventh 
Circuit cases of Foran and Dellinger, and the California district court 
case of In re Shead are the most elucidating. 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Foran was the first case to analyze 
the constitutionality of the Anti-Riot Act.  Foran was decided before 
Brandenburg.  Five plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the 
1968 Anti-Riot Act was unconstitutional on its face and as applied.  The 
court concluded that on its face, the Anti-Riot Act was not so vague as 
to be unconstitutional, and the court did not consider whether the Act 
might be misapplied.372  
The plaintiffs in Foran alleged that the statute extended to cover guilt 
by association, loss of control over a peaceful assembly, and strict 
liability for the acts of anyone joining an intended peaceful 
demonstration.  The Seventh Circuit rejected these arguments, reasoning 
 
 366. 18 U.S.C. § 2102(a). 
 367. 411 F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1969). 
 368. 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972). 
 369. 302 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Cal. 1969). 
 370. Carter v. United States, 417 F.2d 384, 386 (9th Cir. 1969). 
 371. See United .States. v. Hoffman, 334 F. Supp. 504 (D.D.C. 1971). 
 372. Foran, 411 F.2d at 938. 
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that the statute required intent to engage in one of the prohibited overt 
acts, and thus would not extend to innocent participation in a 
demonstration.373  The court concluded that “the federal government has 
a strong interest in preventing violence to persons and injury to their 
property, and when clear and present danger of riot appears, the power 
of Congress to punish is obvious.”374  The Seventh Circuit in Foran did 
not, however, reach whether the Act is constitutional where riot consists 
of a threat of violence rather than actual violence, or risk of damage 
rather than damage itself. 
In In re Shead, a California district court agreed with Foran that 
Section 2101 was constitutional.375  Although this case was later 
affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Carter (with a decision not to reach the 
statute’s constitutionality for lack of standing), In re Shead is still worth 
examining because it is one of few examples of detailed analysis of the 
statute’s terms.376  Despite agreeing with Foran, the court noted that 
“Brandenburg may require a further discussion of the constitutionality 
of 18 U.S.C. § 2101 . . . .”377 The court succinctly summarized the 
statute as follows: 
Congress has made it a crime if there is an intent to promote a riot at the 
time of use of interstate or foreign facilities and at that time or thereafter, 
the additionally-required overt acts are committed.  This intent must be to 
promote, and the overt acts must be committed for the purpose of 
promoting, the disturbances defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2102(a) . . . .378 
In re Shead addresses two arguments against the constitutionality of 
Section 2101.  The first concerns the link between incitement and the 
definition of riot.  The court reasoned that “[i]f the disturbances 
promoted or threatened constitute a clear and present danger, the overt 
acts themselves which are committed for that purpose, necessarily must 
also constitute a clear and present danger.”379  Thus, the court 
concluded, the inclusion of clear and present danger in the statute’s 
definition of riot sufficiently limits the conduct condemned by the Anti-
Riot Act to the Brandenburg standard. 
This view is mistaken for two reasons.  First, it mistakenly exports 
imminence from the act being incited (riot) to the link between 
incitement and the action being incited (the damage referred to in the 
definition of riot).  The statute bans inciting acts of violence that in turn 
 
 373. Id.  
 374. Id. at 939. 
 375. In re Shead, 302 F. Supp. 560, 564 (N.D. Cal. 1969). 
 376. See Carter v. United States, 417 F.2d 384, 386 (9th Cir. 1969). 
 377. In re Shead, 302 F.Supp. at 565. 
 378. Id. 
 379. Id. at 566. 
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create the clear and present danger of damage.  This is not equivalent to 
banning the incitement of imminent and likely violence.  In other words, 
incitement of violence that is not itself likely or imminent does not 
create a clear and present danger of damage, even where the violence, if 
it were to occur, would itself create a clear and present danger of 
damage. 
Second, as discussed at great length above, the Anti-Riot Act defines 
“riot” to include threats.  These do not actually create a clear and present 
danger of damage.  The statute’s definition of “riot” in fact includes 
“threats of the commission of acts of violence . . . where the 
performance of the threatened act or acts of violence would constitute a 
clear and present danger of . . . damage or injury to the property of any 
other person or to the person.”380  Under this definition of riot, the 
disturbance promoted does not actually constitute a clear and present 
danger of anything.  Riot constitutes a threat that, if acted on, would 
constitute a clear and present danger of damage.  This means that 
incitement to that threat does not itself create a clear and present danger; 
it creates a threat that if acted on would result in an act that would 
constitute a clear and present danger.  But there is nothing in the federal 
definition of riot that requires that threat to be likely to be performed. 
The plaintiffs in In re Shead also argued that the language in Section 
2102(b) means that the statute unconstitutionally prohibits mere 
advocacy of violence.  The district court disagreed.  It held that the 
“double negative” excluding “advocacy of violence” from exceptions to 
the incitement statute did not bring all “advocacy of violence” into the 
statute’s purview.  Moreover, it held that Section 2102(b) in fact results 
in the “total exclusion [from the statute] of expression not involving 
advocacy of violence, whether or not the intent and required overt acts 
fall within the coverage of 18 U.S.C. § 2101(a), 2102(a).”381 
The Seventh Circuit returned to the Anti-Riot Act some years later in 
United States v. Dellinger.382  The Seventh Circuit agreed to revisit the 
statute despite Foran because Brandenburg had been decided in the 
interim, the defendants raised new issues not raised in Foran, and 
because the Act “operates in an area where there is substantial potential 
for abridgment of expression . . . .”383 
 
 380. 18 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (2011). 
 381. In re Shead, 302 F. Supp. at 566.  I disagree with this analysis, because there are two 
categories mentioned in subparagraph (b): (1) “[mere] advocacy of ideas or . . . expression of belief” and 
(2) “advocacy of any act or acts of violence or assertion of rightness of [violence].”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2102(b) (2011).  This doesn’t get rid of all acts that incite a riot that are not mere advocacy of ideas or 
expression of belief, such as, for example, advocacy to threat.  But this reading may be a way of making 
the statute constitutional. 
 382. 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972). 
 383. Id. at 354–55. 
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For the first time in a case addressing the Anti-Riot Act, the Seventh 
Circuit explained that restrictions on riot could be problematic under the 
First Amendment.  The court wrote that: 
[R]ioting, in history and by nature, almost invariably occurs as an 
expression of political, social, or economic reactions, if not ideas.  The 
rioting assemblage is usually protesting the policies of a government, an 
employer, or some other institution, or the social fabric in general, as was 
probably the case in the riots of 1967 and 1968 which are the backdrop 
for this legislation.  A second reason is that a riot may well erupt out of 
an originally peaceful demonstration which many participants intended to 
maintain as such.384 
Because of these substantial First Amendment concerns inherent in 
prohibiting riot, and because the defendants in Dellinger in fact were 
being prosecuted based on speeches they had given, the court explained 
that the “removed expression must have a very substantial capacity to 
propel action, or some similarly entwining relationship with it.”385 
Thus, the Seventh Circuit in Dellinger asked “whether, properly 
construed,” the Anti-Riot Act “punishes speech only when a sufficiently 
close relationship between such speech and violent action is found to 
exist.”386  The court held that the Act did punish only sufficiently 
entwined speech, and thus was constitutional.387  
The Seventh Circuit reached this conclusion based on three prongs of 
analysis.  First, it construed “incitement” as “sufficiently likely to propel 
the violent action to be identified with action.”388  Second, it held that 
the definition of riot was “enough of an assault on the property and 
personal safety interests of the community so that participation in a riot 
or intentionally and successfully causing a riot can be made a criminal 
offense.”389  And third, the court addressed that same “double negative” 
in Section 2102(b) concerning the exclusion of advocacy of violence 
from the exceptions to incitement, and concluded that rather than 
bringing “mere advocacy” of violence into the scope of the statute, 
which would indeed be unconstitutional, the language of Section 
2102(b) was meant to forestall a defense that advocacy to violence is 
always excluded.390 
 
 384. Id. at 359. 
 385. Id. 
 386. Id. at 360. 
 387. Id. at 355. 
 388. Id. at 360. 
 389. Id. at 361. 
 390. Id. at 363 (reasoning that “propelling speech will include advocacy of acts of violence and 
assertion of the rightness of such acts, and intended that the challenged phrase forestall any claim by 
such speaker that in that context such advocacy and assertion constitute mere advocacy of ideas or 
expression of belief excluded under (1) and (2)”). 
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I retain the same criticism of the link made between the definition of 
riot and incitement as I have outlined at great length above.  The 
Seventh Circuit was wrong that incitement, as defined by the Anti-Riot 
Act, is sufficiently entwined with action to be identified with that action 
rather than protected as speech.  The federal definition of incitement to 
riot includes inciting other people to create a mere threat of action, 
rather than inciting other people to actually do damage.  I also do not 
read the Anti-Riot Act as requiring real harm to occur; it requires only 
that the assembled group be able to act on its threat, which, if acted 
upon, would create a clear and present danger of damage.  Thus, the 
Anti-Riot Act’s prohibitions are so attenuated from actual harm as to be 
unconstitutional. 
The Seventh Circuit in Dellinger evinced significant trepidation about 
its holding.  The court ran through several hypothetical scenarios that it 
found particularly problematic.  It explained that: 
We do not pretend to minimize the first amendment problems presented 
on the face of this statute.  In one hypothetical application, the statute 
could result in punishment of one who, having traveled interstate, or used 
the mail, with intent to promote a riot, attempted to make a speech or 
circulate a handbill for the purpose of encouraging three people to riot.  
Arguably the statute does not require that the speech, if made, or the 
handbill, if circulated, succeed in any substantial degree in encouraging 
the audience to riot.  Arguably a frustrated attempt to speak or circulate 
would not achieve the constitutionally essential relationship with action 
in any event.  Arguably the statute does not require that a speech or 
handbill succeed in producing a riot or bringing the persons addressed to 
the brink of a riot, prevented only by some intervening and superseding 
force, and arguably no less degree of propelling of action by speech or 
handbill will suffice, even though intent to succeed must also be proved.  
Although we reject these arguments, in part as constructions of the 
statute, and in part as grounds for declaring it void, we acknowledge the 
case is close.391 
Thus, the federal Anti-Riot Act remains a problematic means to 
prosecute speakers who call for a group to assemble. 
VII. ARE MOBS SPECIAL? 
At the heart of the common law definition of riot lies an 
understanding of crowds as inherently disruptive and uncontrollable.  
Although flash mobs are a recent occurrence, mobs and their associated 
problems are not.  There is a longstanding history in the United States of 
both mob activity and government fear of mob behavior.  The actual 
 
 391. Id. at 362. 
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nature of crowds, however, does not support this fear.392 
This Part first shows that there is a historical relationship between 
understandings of crowd psychology and First Amendment theory.  It 
then explains why anti-riot laws exist, and provides policy suggestions 
as to what a good anti-riot law might do. 
The first Subpart discusses the history of U.S. intellectuals’ 
understanding of mob behavior, and how it influenced the development 
of First Amendment theory.  The second Subpart moves from history to 
social psychology.  The field of crowd psychology emerged in the 
1890s, describing crowds as naturally anarchic.393  More recent social 
psychology pushes back against this normative conclusion, describing 
instead two factors that lead certain crowds to mob violence: legitimacy 
and perception of power.394  Other work suggests that crowds in general 
act no differently than a group of individuals.395  By contrast, network 
theory explains that under certain circumstances, crowds can behave 
differently than individuals, because crowds can lead to swarming 
behavior after they reach critical density.396 
This Part concludes that if governments regulate crowds at all, 
regulation should be based on the reality of crowd behavior, not a 
historical fear of mob action. 
A. The Historical Relationship Between Crowd Psychology and First 
Amendment Theory 
Intellectuals’ perceptions of how crowds behave have influenced the 
development of First Amendment theory.  In Fear of the Mob and Faith 
in Government in Free Speech Discourse, 1919–1941, legal historian 
Richard W. Steele tracks the development of First Amendment law 
 
 392. Baker, supra note 208, at 981–82 (“There is a deeply engrained view of collective or mass 
behavior as being irrational, fickle, violent, undirected, and contagious.  This view may influence the 
tendency in legal thought to assume a need to restrict the range of assemblies that receive protection.  
Nevertheless, historical studies consistently reject this vision of the “crowd.”  Increased historical 
awareness implicitly supports the propriety of protecting a broader range of assemblies.  Historians 
apparently find that what we might call a disruptive assembly—usually described as a “mob” or a 
“crowd” depending on one’s value commitments—is usually quite rational in its choice of targets for the 
application of force.  Also, although the assembled people occasionally destroy property, these studies 
find that the crowd or mob, in stark contrast to the authorities who respond, seldom kill or injure other 
people.  Typically, the crowd’s use of force and violence seems restrained.”). 
 393. GUSTAVE LE BON, LA PSYCHOLOGIE DES FOULES (1895). 
 394. See Wasik, supra note 5. 
 395. Cf. David Schweingruber & Ronald T. Wohlstein, The Madding Crowd Goes to School: 
Myths about Crowds in Introductory Sociology Textbooks, 33 TEACHING SOC. 136, 144 (2005). 
 396. See John Seabrook, Crush Point, NEW YORKER, Feb. 7, 2011, 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/02/07/110207fa_fact_seabrook?currentPage=all (citing John 
J. Fruin, The Causes and Prevention of Crowd Disasters (Mar. 1993) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.crowdsafe.com/). 
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between the World Wars.397 Steele explains that free speech theory was 
developed based on intellectuals’ views about crowd behavior.  As 
intellectuals changed their view about the nature of crowds, they 
changed their theory of what government should be able to do with 
respect to speech regulation. 
Americans have not always conceived of crowds as bad. In colonial 
times, Americans believed that mobs occurred only because of abuse of 
power by the government.398  Popular uprisings were “an 
evil . . . productive of good.”399  In 1768, the conservative Thomas 
Hutchinson stated that “[m]obs, a sort of them at least, are 
constitutional.”400 
Around the beginning of the twentieth century, however, American 
social and political thinkers became deeply concerned with the danger of 
mob rule.401 Gustave Le Bon’s The Crowd, a popular book in the era, 
depicted groups as more easily moved to gullibility and irrationality than 
individuals.402  Jurist Roscoe Pound observed that in the United States, 
crowd mentality manifested in Americans’ tendency toward the 
vigilante mob.403  
By the first decade of the twentieth century, the emerging national 
elite began to see vigilantism as dangerous.  A Senate committee 
investigated vigilante activities in Colorado in 1904,404 and Congress 
attempted, but failed, to outlaw lynching in 1922.405  The Supreme Court 
addressed vigilantism in Moore v. Dempsey in 1923, upholding the duty 
of the federal judiciary to intercede in a state trial to determine if the 
outcome had been shaped by mob intimidation.406 
Free speech theory developed in part against the backdrop of this fear 
 
 397. Richard W. Steele, Fear of the Mob and Faith in Government in Free Speech Discourse, 
1919–1941, 38 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 55 (1994). 
 398. Baker, supra note 208.  According to Pauline Maier, an historian writing about the period, 
colonial Americans expressed the view that “Mobs and Tumults never happen but thro’ oppression and 
a scandalous Abuse of Power.”  People recognized that popular uprisings, by bringing popular feelings 
to the attention of public authorities, were “an evil . . . productive of good.”  Occurring most often under 
free governments, these uprisings “could be interpreted as ‘Symptoms of a strong and healthy 
Constitution.’”  Thus, Maier concluded that “popular uprisings benefited from a certain presumptive 
acceptability that was founded in part on colonial experience with mass action.”  She even quotes “the 
conservative Thomas Hutchinson” as saying in 1768 that “[m]obs, a sort of them at least, are 
constitutional.”  Id. at 980. 
 399. Id. 
 400. Id. 
 401. Steele, supra note 397, at 56–57. 
 402. Baker, supra note 208, at 981 n.112. 
 403. See ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 11, 123–24 (1930). 
 404. Steele, supra note 397, at 57. 
 405. Robert M. Cover, The Left, The Right and the First Amendment: 1918–1928, 40 MD. L. REV. 
349, 356 (1981). 
 406. 261 U.S. 86, 92 (1923). 
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of vigilantism.  The American Bar Association promulgated a property 
rights-based civil libertarianism to defend individual wealth against 
assaults by the masses.407  On the other side of the political spectrum, 
intellectuals feared the growth of a collective “intolerant spirit” 
evidenced by the Ku Klux Klan, the prohibition movement, and efforts 
to stamp out evolutionism, resulting in a need to limit the power of 
majorities.408 
Harvard professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr. situated free speech with 
respect to mob behavior.409  Free expression both protected minority 
speech from the dictates of the majority, and provided a safety valve for 
complaints that could otherwise develop into rebellion. 
Steele points out that the Supreme Court First Amendment cases of 
the time generally stemmed from actions performed by state and local 
governments.410  States were seen as either instruments of mass hysteria, 
or as unable to deal with wrongs rooted in mass intolerance.411  A 1931 
Yale Law Journal article discussing freedom of speech noted that states 
failed to protect men from violence and mobs.412 
By 1939, federal authority had become the avowed locus of the 
protection of free expression from popular repression.413  The Justice 
Department investigated the intimidation of coal miners in Kentucky,414 
and the Criminal Division established a special unit to address civil 
rights violations.415 
As protection of free expression consolidated in federal hands, the 
intellectual conception of mob mentality changed.  In the 1930s, Steele 
argues, the success of fascism and Nazism shifted intellectual thinking 
about mob behavior.  Instead of fearing local majorities who would 
suppress the minority view, intellectuals began fearing the “human 
herd[’s]” capacity to be led into revolution.416  As Steele puts it, “the 
masses were not congenitally evil, just infinitely malleable.”417  The 
 
 407. Steele, supra note 397, at 57. 
 408. Id. at 59–60. 
 409. Zechariah Chafee Jr., Freedom of Speech, 17 NEW REPUBLIC 67 (1918).  See also Zechariah 
Chafee Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1919); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920). 
 410. Steele, supra note 397, at 64. 
 411. Id. at 65. 
 412. See Comment, The Supreme Court’s Attitude Toward Liberty of Contract and Freedom of 
Speech, 41 YALE L. J. 262, 267 (1931). 
 413. Steele, supra note 397, at 68–69. 
 414. See JOHN W. HEVENER, WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON? THE HARLAN COUNTY COAL MINERS, 
1931–39, at 150–53 (1978). 
 415. Henry Schweinhaut, The Civil Liberties Section of the Department of Justice, 1 BILL RTS. 
REV. 206, 206 (1940). 
 416. Steele, supra note 397, at 70. 
 417. Id. at 71. 
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“charismatic leader” was now the threat, not the vigilante mob itself.418 
Orson Welles’s famous War of the Worlds prank cemented this 
understanding of crowd behavior by creating mass panic through a radio 
broadcast,419 and a number of treatises on the topic appeared, by authors 
such as Peter Drucker, Waldo Frank, McGeorge Bundy, and Lewis 
Mumford.420 
Days after Germany’s 1939 assault on Poland, Attorney General 
Frank Murphy announced his intention to curb intolerance and protect 
deserving minorities—by dealing with “un-American” activities that 
might rouse fascist mob behavior.421  The ABA’s Bill of Rights 
Committee, which had previously been concerned with protecting civil 
liberties to protect property rights, now supported expanding federal 
police surveillance.422  Steele observes that by 1941, leftist intellectuals 
such as historian George Mowry supported federal protection from 
fascism by cracking down on the Right.423  Max Lerner similarly 
concluded that the greater danger to minorities was not from the federal 
government, but from local vigilantism.424  This sentiment extended to 
civil libertarians: Roger Baldwin, the founder of the ACLU, developed 
cordial relations with FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, although he did 
express reservations about Hoover’s authority to compile a list of 
potential subversives.425 
Steele’s detailed description of the development of intellectual 
thought on free expression between the World Wars evinces a historical 
relationship between conceptions of mob behavior and understanding of 
what role government should play.  In the 1920s, theorists believed that 
crowds led to anarchic behavior and repressive majority rule through 
vigilante justice.  Therefore, theorists at the time thought minority 
speakers should be protected from the excesses of crowd repression.  
Consistent with this understanding, a number of states have anti-
vigilante approaches to riot laws, with explicit prohibitions of 
lynchings,426 and make cities liable for damage that occurs when they 
 
 418. Id. at 72. 
 419. See HADLEY CANTRIL, THE INVASION FROM MARS, A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PANIC 
(1940). 
 420. Steele, supra note 397, at 72–73. 
 421. Id. at 74–75. 
 422. See generally John E. Mulder, Changing Concepts of Civil Liberties, 1 BILL RTS. REV. 95 
(1941). 
 423. Steele, supra note 397, at 75. 
 424. Max Lerner, Discussion, in WAR AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION 184, 187–88 (1966). 
 425. See Steele, supra note 397, at 76, 80. 
 426. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 61-6-7 (2012) (the Red Man’s Act of 1882), invalidated by State v. 
Postelwait, 239 S.E.2d 734 (W. Va. 1977); W. VA CODE § 61-6-12 (2012) (defining mob as those 
“assembled for the unlawful purpose of offering violence to the person or property of anyone supposed 
to have been guilty of a violation of the law, or for the purpose of exercising correctional or regulative 
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fail to prevent vigilante justice.427 
In the late 1930s, against the rise of fascism, theorists instead saw 
crowds as herds that were compelled not of their own accord, but by 
charismatic leaders.  Under that understanding of how mobs form and 
behave, theorists thought government should repress the speech that 
leads to crowd formation, rather than protect individual speech done in 
front of the crowd. 
Although no scholar has analyzed this dynamic after World War II, 
understandings of mob behavior clearly influenced the development of 
the Federal Anti-Riot Act in the 1960s.  The Federal Anti-Riot Act was 
enacted in response to civil disorders of the 1960s.428  It was “based on 
the premise that riots are caused by roving bands of agitators who 
escape across state lines before they can be apprehended by local 
authorities.”429  The bill was styled on the House floor as “a weapon 
against an alleged Communist-inspired anarchy sweeping the 
country.”430 
This historical relationship between U.S. society’s understanding of 
crowd behavior and the regulation of speech is more complex than a 
dichotomous understanding that mobs are good when they are peaceful 
and political but bad when they are violent and consisting of low value 
speech.  The fundamental understanding of what a mob is matters when 
it comes to figuring out the boundaries of acceptable governmental 
regulation. 
B. Current Crowd Psychology 
Understanding how a mob works—whether it is inevitably anarchic, 
or harmless but prone to following calls to violence—is crucial to 
making sense of whether and how to regulate riots.  If crowds are 
inevitably anarchic, it would be logical to regulate all in-person 
gatherings over a certain size.  If crowds are usually harmless, but 
become violent in the face of a charismatic leader, then it would be more 
effective and less harmful to regulate the speaker who calls for a crowd 
to form, and directs that crowd towards violence.  Leaving aside the 
 
powers over any person or persons by violence, and without lawful authority”).  Georgia law punishes: 
[A]ssembly of two or more persons, without authority of law, for the purpose of doing 
violence to the person or property of one supposed by the accused to have been guilty of 
a violation of the law, or for the purpose of exercising correctional or regulative powers 
over any person by violence . . . . 
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-33(2) (2012). 
 427. W. VA. CODE § 61-6-12 (2012). 
 428. Comment, Riot Legislation: A Tale of Two Eras, 68 NW. U.L. REV. 976, 976 (1973). 
 429. Id. at 976–77. 
 430. Id. at 978. 
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First Amendment for a moment, this Subpart attempts to wade through 
crowd psychology to understand how and why riots occur. 
Crowd psychology emerged as a discipline in the 1890s, when 
Gustave Le Bon wrote a famous treatise called The Crowd.431  Other 
scholars wrote about crowd behavior as early as the 1840s.432  Le Bon 
argued that in crowds, individuals disappear into the mental unity of the 
whole.  In the 1950s, American social psychologist Leon Festinger 
named this process of self-effacement “deindividuation.”433  American 
social psychologist Philip Zimbardo took up studies of 
“deindividuation” in the 1970s, famously performing the Stanford 
Prison Experiment of 1971.434 
“Deindividuation” theorizes that through anonymity, crowds allow 
individuals to eschew societal norms, and consequently crowds naturally 
tend towards a state of anarchy and senseless violence.  More recent 
studies show how a group self-selects towards increasingly violent 
behavior, as individuals who do not agree with group goals leave and 
are replaced by those who do.  This version of crowd psychology 
provides much justification for government regulation of crowd 
dynamics, since most crowds under this analysis would be likely to 
disobey laws and cause harm. 
However, the “deindividuation” theory, also referred to as 
“contagion” theory because it posits that crowds transform individual 
people, has prompted much disagreement.  Even introductory sociology 
textbooks limit or reject deindividuation.435  Several other theories have 
emerged to explain crowd behavior offering differing observations about 
how crowds behave. 
Convergence theory argues that crowd behavior is based not on 
transformation of its members but on a shared self-conception and a 
shared set of grievances.436  Research by Clifford Stott suggests that 
riots occur not because individuals anonymously disappear into a crowd, 
but because individuals identify with each other, and frame that identity 
 
 431. See LE BON, supra note 393; see also HENRI FOURNIAL, LA PSYCHOLOGIE DES FOULES 
(1892); GABRIEL TARDE, LES LOIS DE L’IMITATION (1890); GABRIEL TARDE, LA LOGIQUE SOCIALE 
(1895); GABRIEL TARDE, L’OPINION ET LA FOULE (1903). 
 432. See CHARLES MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF 
CROWDS (1841). 
 433. Festinger, L., Pepitone, A. & Newcomb, T., Some Consequences of De-Individuation in a 
Group, 47 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 382 (1952). 
 434. See Philip G. Zimbardo, The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason, and Order Versus 
Deindividuation, Impulse, and Chaos, in 17 NEB. SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION (W.T. Arnold & D. 
Levine eds., 1969). 
 435. Schweingruber & Wohlstein, supra note 395, at 144. 
 436. See Sam Parkovnick, Contextualizing Floyd Allports’s Social Psychology, 36 J. HIST. 
BEHAV. SCI. 429 (2000). 
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in conflict with authority figures such as the police.437  Critics of 
convergence theory point out that it (arguably incorrectly) assumes that 
crowds engage in unanimous or mutually inclusive behavior.438 
A third perspective, called the emergent-norm perspective, defines 
collective behavior as “social behavior in which usual conventions cease 
to guide social action and people collectively transcend, bypass, or 
subvert established institutional patterns and structures.”439  This 
perspective posits that crowds behave with more spontaneity than 
individuals.  Special spontaneity of crowd behavior, however, has been 
refuted by a number of studies.440  
In 2005, David Schweingruber and Ronald T. Wohlstein argued that 
sociology textbooks should do away with overarching theories of crowd 
behavior entirely, and look instead to empirical research that has been 
done on how crowds actually behave.441  They explain that critical 
thinking about crowds has shifted from seeing them as suggestible, 
emotional, and irrational to seeing them as “shaped by the same forces 
that shape other social behavior.”442  
Basing their analysis on work by Carl Couch in 1968443 and Clark 
McPhail in 1991,444 Schweingruber and Wohlstein debunk seven myths 
about crowd behavior: irrationality, emotionality, suggestibility, 
destructiveness, spontaneity, anonymity, and unanimity.  The myth of 
irrationality claims that crowds cause people to lose their ability to 
engage in rational thought; for example, causing panic.445  However, 
research into emergency dispersal has shown that people in crowds in 
dangerous situations don’t panic, but instead are guided by social 
relationships and exhibit altruistic behavior.446  The myth of 
emotionality claims that people in crowds are more governed by their 
emotions.447  Both Couch’s 1968 work and a 1987 study by Turner and 
Killian argue that emotions are in fact present in many social 
interactions, and crowds are not exceptional in this regard.448 
 
 437. See Wasik, supra note 5. 
 438. See CLARK MCPHAIL, THE MYTH OF THE MADDING CROWD 71 (1991). 
 439. RALPH H. TURNER & LEWIS M. KILLIAN, COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 3 (3d ed. 1987). 
 440. See generally CHARLES TILLY, FROM MOBILIZATION TO REVOLUTION (1978); Michael J. 
Rosenfeld, Celebration, Politics, Selective Looting and Riots: A Micro Level Study of the Bulls Riot of 
1992 in Chicago, 44 SOC. PROBS. 483 (1997); Carl J. Couch, Collective Behavior: An Examination of 
Some Stereotypes, 15 SOC. PROBS. 310 (1968). 
 441. See Schweingruber & Wohlstein, supra note 395, at 146. 
 442. Id. 
 443. Couch, supra note 439, at 310. 
 444. MCPHAIL, supra note 437. 
 445. Schweingruber & Wohlstein, supra note 395, at 138. 
 446. Id. 
 447. Id. 
 448. See id.  See also TURNER & KILLIAN, supra note 438, at 13. 
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The third myth is that people in crowds are more likely to obey 
others.  No research supports this conclusion.  The fact that crowds 
usually do not disperse when ordered to by authorities suggests that the 
myth of suggestibility may in fact be incorrect.449  The fourth myth 
claims that people in crowds are more likely to be violent. Couch argued 
that in clashes between crowds and authorities, the authorities in fact 
commit more violence than the crowds.450  Research has shown that 
crowd violence is rare,451 and is often carried out by small groups within 
the gathering.452  Police interaction with crowds may in fact spur crowd 
violence where it wouldn’t otherwise occur.453 
No research has demonstrated that crowd behavior is more 
spontaneous than individual behavior.454  In fact, studies have shown 
that many crowds require planning or rely on “repertoires of collective 
action” that are understood by other members of the culture, such as 
strikes or boycotts.455 
Deindividuation relies in large part on the idea that people in crowds 
are anonymous and thus unaccountable for their behavior, which allows 
them to do things they otherwise would not do.  A number of studies 
have noted that crowds are not composed of anonymous individuals, but 
of small groups that know each other well.456  Anonymity may exist vis 
à vis authority figures, but not with respect to other members of the 
crowd.457  Presumably, then, social norms would still be enforced 
between these individuals.  Individuals gather not because they seek to 
benefit from anonymity, but because of the social links and common 
goals they share. 
The myth of unanimity claims that crowds act in unison.  Research 
has shown that crowds in fact contain alternating and varying individual 
and collective actions, with unanimous or near-unanimous behavior 
being rare and short-lived.458 
 
 449. See Schweingruber & Wohlstein, supra note 395, at 139. 
 450. Id. at 139. 
 451. Id. 
 452. Clifford Stott & Stephen Reicher, Crowd Action as Intergroup Process: Introducing the 
Police Perspective, 28 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCH. 509, 516–17 (1998). 
 453. See generally Patrick F. Gillham & Gary T. Marx, Complexity and Irony in Policing and 
Protesting: The World Trade Organization in Seattle, 27 SOC. JUST. 212 (2000). 
 454. Schweingruber & Wohlstein, supra note 395, at 139. 
 455. See generally Charles Tilly, Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758–1834, 17 SOC. 
SCI. HIST. 253 (1993); Rosenfeld, supra note 439; Couch, supra note 439, at 319. 
 456. See, e.g., Adrian F. Aveni, The Not-so-Lonely Crowd: Friendship Groups in Collective 
Behavior, 40 SOCIOMETRY 96 (1977). 
 457. Id. 
 458. See generally MCPHAIL, supra note 437; Clark McPhail & David Schweingruber, Unpacking 
Protest Events: A Description Bias Analysis of Media Records with Systematic Direct Observations of 
Collective Action—The 1995 March For Life in Washington D.C., in ACTS OF DISSENT: NEW 
74
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss1/1
2012] INCITEMENT TO RIOT 75 
So what do crowds actually look like?  Much research has been done 
about the assembling and dispersal process, and the composition of 
crowds.459  Temporal availability and spatial access are both important.  
People usually assemble with small groups of companions within the 
crowd.  Crowds may be subdivided into different categories based on 
features such as level of organization; political demonstrations differ 
from “prosaic crowds.”460 
One feature of crowds that has been confirmed as unique to crowd as 
opposed to individual behavior is the tendency to “swarm.”  Soccer 
games and rock concerts in particular have generated deadly crowds, 
where participants die of “compressional asphyxia” from the pressure of 
people swarming around them.461  These crushes are not produced by 
“panic,” which evidence does not support, but by “crazes”—people 
moving towards something they want, rather than away from something 
they fear.462  Swarms require large numbers, or high density.  At critical 
densities, crowds change from collective behavior (such as avoiding 
each other on a busy street) to failing to behave collectively.  Unlike 
ants, humans cannot transmit information about the physical dynamics 
of a crowd across a swarm.463  Individuals at the back of a crowd have 
no feedback that they are injuring those in the front. 
In this particular feature of crowd behavior, there is actually an 
argument for allowing incitement: having leaders can prevent a swarm, 
because everybody looks to the leader for communication about the 
group.  As long as the leader is outside of the crush and visible, the 
swarm might be prevented. 
C. What an Anti-Riot Law Should Address, Given Current 
Understanding of Crowds 
Legislators should consider crowd psychology in determining the 
goals of any anti-riot laws.  In practice, anti-riot legislation arises from a 
longstanding tradition of fear of mob behavior, and from outdated 
common law traditions.464 
 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE STUDY OF PROTEST (1998). 
 459. Schweingruber & Wohlstein, supra note 395, at 146. 
 460. Id. at 147. 
 461. Seabrook, supra note 395 (citing John J. Fruin, The Causes and Prevention of Crowd 
Disasters (Mar. 1993) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.crowdsafe.com/). 
 462. Id.  
 463. Id. (citing Dirk Helbing, Pedestrian, Crowd, and Evacuation Dynamics, ENCYCOPEDIA 
COMPLEXITY & SYSS. SCI. (2010)). 
 464. Baker agrees, and points out:  
The major scholarly impetus for the rejection of Le Bon’s views and of the 
psychologists’ and sociologists’ disparaging treatment of the crowd or mob has resulted 
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Leaving First Amendment considerations aside for a moment, the 
following paragraphs outline (1) the harm, specific to riots, that 
legislators want to prevent; and (2) the features of a statute that, with a 
basis in crowd psychology, could prevent or punish riots.  Current 
legislation does not map onto what we know about crowd behavior. 
Mobs are harmful for a number of reasons.  First and foremost, they 
can actually become violent or destructive.  Second, mobs can 
overwhelm the police, making enforcement more difficult.  Third, by 
their nature, mobs threaten existing social structure.  Fourth, at least one 
strand of crowd psychology, deindividuation, suggests that mobs 
themselves cause the people in them to do bad things. 
When a mob actually causes harm, clearly the direct perpetrators of 
that harm should be punished.  Whether that punishment should be 
extended to the whole of the mob is another story.  Deindividuation 
would suggest that the entire crowd is responsible for the anarchic 
crowd mentality, so the entire crowd should be punished for being 
present when the bad acts occur.  Conversely, convergence theorists see 
mobs as being made of like-minded individuals and would therefore 
hold each individual accountable only for his or her own acts and intent.  
A third approach is possible: multiple studies show that a mob is in fact 
made out of small groups of people who know each other well, 
suggesting that it might be fair to punish the people within that 
immediate small group, rather than the whole of the crowd. 
The other categories of possible harm—overwhelming the police, 
threatening social structure, and exacerbating the tendency of members 
to do crimes—suggest that mobs or riots might be punished for existing 
as a gathering in large numbers, whether or not an act of violence takes 
place.  This suggestion is dangerous from a First Amendment 
perspective, because it brings exercise of the right of assembly into 
collision with regulating mob activity. 
Deindividuation theorists would presumably punish assemblies of a 
certain size, under the theory that large crowds inevitably lead to bad 
behavior.  Legislators relying on deindividuation theory could be more 
careful, and punish large crowds that appear to be kicking out more 
moderate members as they unify towards bad anarchic behavior.  Such 
laws could refer to the common intent of those present. 
 
from historians’ study of actual crowds.  The foundational work is that of George Rude.  
Although these historians emphasize the need to study the behavior of crowds in their 
social and historical context, they repeatedly find the crowd to be rational in its choice of 
both ends and means and consistently find its behavior to be oriented around some 
legitimizing norm.  In the years since these ground breaking studies, these conclusions 
and the rejection of Le Bon’s view of the crowd have been both affirmed and extended in 
a rich body of historical literature focusing on Great Britain and the United States. 
Baker, supra note 208, 982 n.114 (citing a variety of sources). 
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Convergence theorists instead believe that crowds are not innately 
bad, but may give rise to bad behavior under certain conditions.  Both 
legitimacy and power are required for crowds to turn violent.465  If 
legislators are convinced by convergence theory, they might look to 
evidence that the mob is going after the police or otherwise legitimizing 
itself by countering existing social structure.  For evidence of internal 
belief in the mob’s power, they again might look to the size of the 
gathering, or presence of weapons. 
Numbers therefore are important under several theories of crowd 
behavior.  For deindividuation theorists, a large crowd is required for 
people to feel adequately anonymous and unrestrained by social 
strictures.  For convergence theorists, a large number is required for a 
crowd to believe it has the power to act.  For those researching 
swarming patterns, a high density of bodies is necessary for a swarm to 
take place.  Nobody, however, has estimated what that critical number 
might be. 
This presents what philosophers call the sorites paradox, which arises 
when it is difficult to determine the boundaries of a concept.  For 
example, it is unclear at which point a collection of individual grains 
becomes a heap.  This could lead to the false conclusion that a collection 
of grains can never become a heap.466  Similarly, it may be impossible to 
identify the precise number of people at which a group gathering 
becomes a crowd capable of swarming, but we may still believe that 
mobs, as such, exist.  Thus, states must struggle with determining the 
number of people that gives rise to dangerous crowd behavior. 
As discussed above, Schweingruber and Wohlstein convincingly 
argue that crowds may just be an example of multiple individuals acting 
at the same time, with no additional characteristic imputed by the 
crowd’s existence.  Under this understanding, crowds should be 
regulated only if one would regulate an individual doing the same 
activity.  Numbers should not matter, except with respect to how hard it 
would be to police multiple individuals acting at the same time.  This 
view is in line with Baker’s theory of freedom of assembly, outlined 
above, in which Baker explains that states cannot regulate an assembly 
for doing something where they would not regulate an individual for 
doing that same thing. 
Similarly, Schweingruber and Wohlstein argue that crowds are no 
more susceptible to acting on command than individuals.  This suggests 
that incitement-to-riot statutes should regulate actual harm caused by 
crowd behavior, not the interaction between a speaker and a crowd.  
 
 465. See Wasik, supra note 5. 
 466. See Dominic Hyde, Sorites Paradox, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (1997), 
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sorites-paradox/. 
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Incitement to riot should not be based on a myth that speaking to a large 
assembly is more likely to produce action than speaking to an 
individual. 
State riot statutes apply to surprisingly small groups of people.  They 
contain no language about crowd density, the one factor research 
supports may contribute to harm caused specifically by crowds.  Instead, 
state statutes rely on dated misunderstandings—that allowing people to 
assemble in groups increases the chance that collective behavior will 
become anarchic and riotous.  As a matter of policy, rather than 
constitutional theory, this is a mistake and overregulates behavior that 
may not lead to harm at all. 
VIII. DO NEW MEDIA MATTER? 
There have been a number of claims that the internet and social media 
have changed the ways in which crowds gather.  The question is 
whether these features require either a change in the Brandenburg 
standard, or additional regulation specifically targeting online 
communication.  I believe they do not.  Claims about internet 
exceptionalism include the following: the internet breeds extremism; the 
internet allows people to tap into a “mega-underground” of niche 
participants; the internet allows for a larger scale of people to be reached 
in a “cyber cascade”; the internet allows for a greater diversity of 
geographic origin; the internet allows for greater speed and spontaneity; 
and the internet makes crowd dispersal impossible. 
Cass R. Sunstein claims that by its nature, online communication 
breeds extremism.467  Groups of like-minded people become more 
extreme in their collective views as they talk amongst themselves,468 and 
Sunstein asserts that the internet, more than other media, allows these 
groups to filter what content they receive and create an echo chamber.  
From a crowd psychology perspective, this means that groups have pre-
selected for identity, which preemptively contributes to both their sense 
of legitimacy and the deindividuation of individuals within the group, 
causing them to be more likely to disregard social strictures and commit 
violence. 
However, Sunstein’s assertion about online fragmentation has been 
widely contested.  Yochai Benkler, for example, describes an internet 
where “clusters of moderately read sites provide platforms for vastly 
greater numbers of speakers,” and those clustering sites are often of 
general interest rather than extremist views.469  A 2004 Pew study 
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similarly concluded that many Americans learn about competing views 
online.470  Moreover, Sunstein himself notes that this process of self-
reinforcement is by no means limited to the internet as medium; special 
interest radio, television, and even newspapers, can produce the same 
effect.471  The claim that communication breeds extremism is no more 
applicable to the internet than to other existing media, and consequently 
requires no change in Brandenburg. 
Related to this idea of the echo chamber is the claim that the internet 
allows niche groups to form that would be too costly to assemble in real 
life.  This claim has real substance, but it is not clear that it should affect 
Brandenburg analysis.  The idea stems from Chris Anderson’s idea of 
the “long tail,” which argues that the enormous size of the online 
customer base ensures that online retailers will provide goods to a niche 
market that is not worth serving offline.472  Similarly, people with niche 
political interests can find each other online, where it would have been 
too costly for them to gather in person.473  Bill Wasik refers to these 
large niches as “mega-undergrounds,” and suggests that many flash 
mobs occur because underground niche groups feel a need to publicly 
identify themselves in person.474  This may accurately describe a new 
feature of online behavior, but it does not in itself indicate a new reason 
to regulate or a need for a new method of regulation.  The fact that 
group members can find each other more effectively does not lead to a 
conclusion that government should regulate them more. 
However, a related feature of online communication is its ability to 
reach huge numbers of people, and one can more convincingly argue 
that this feature requires a reassessment of the incitement standard.  
Sunstein explains that the internet reaches “hundreds, thousands, or even 
millions,” referring to the quick accumulation of mass communication 
as a cyber “cascade.”475  Wasik’s mega-undergrounds differ from past 
niche groups in that they are “mega.”  These groups also gather from a 
much more geographically diverse area than past crowds did.476  The 
size of a crowd may have implications for Brandenburg’s application to 
incitement to riot, as it has implications for how much damage a crowd 
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might cause. 
But Brandenburg contains no mention of the impact on the size of a 
group of listeners on First Amendment analysis; and other cases 
protected assemblies of over 2000 people, suggesting that size, in fact, 
does not matter.477  Additionally, incitement-to-riot statutes already 
penalize groups as small as three to ten people, suggesting that the 
internet’s ability to reach masses has no impact on the potential 
applicability of existing laws any more than it impacts constitutional 
standards.  The legal question raised is not a Brandenburg question but a 
question of court interpretation of incitement-to-riot statutes: will an 
online speaker need to intend to reach a crowd of a particular size, or 
can he or she be held liable merely for speaking to the online 
community more generally, with the understanding that the speech is 
likely to reach a large number of individuals?  Because of the small 
numbers involved in most incitement-to-riot statutes, this will likely be 
an insignificant question, because most people could be found to have 
the specific intent to reach more than three other people with online 
speech. 
The most significant claim about internet exceptionalism concerns the 
speed of communication.  This might impact Brandenburg’s imminence 
requirement.  Wasik celebrates the fact that flash mobs are often “highly 
spontaneous; the crowd is told where they were going and what they 
will do there only minutes beforehand.”478  If groups can form so 
quickly that police cannot react, there might be an argument for ignoring 
the imminence requirement and allowing regulation before the call to 
arms happens.  This, however, is exactly why Brandenburg has an 
imminence standard: the further back from actual harm regulation gets, 
the more it impinges on free expression. 
Paradoxically, the other imminence issue raised by online 
communications is that a speaker might announce a gathering too far in 
advance, and thus put him or herself outside of Brandenburg’s range of 
imminence entirely.  A number of scholars have bemoaned the 
Brandenburg imminence requirement in the context of instruction 
manuals and hit lists.479  This concern does not have anything to do with 
the internet as a medium, since publication of plans or hit lists as books 
and pamphlets raise the same problems.  Hess appears to address this 
issue, reasoning that the state cannot regulate the “advocacy of illegal 
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action at some indefinite future time.”480  But if a person advocates an 
action at a definite future time, it is not clear how imminent that future 
time must be for Brandenburg to allow regulation.481  This is not a 
question of changing Brandenburg; it is a question of its application, 
and how courts choose to interpret the imminence requirement. 
Brandenburg suggests that when action is advocated far enough in 
advance, police can prepare for it and avert danger through preparation; 
therefore, suppression or punishment of non-imminent speech is not 
allowed.  It is only when the danger is so imminent that police cannot 
prepare themselves that regulation of incitement is justified.  This 
analysis does not change when the communication is made online.  In 
fact, online communication is centralized, often searchable, and not 
ephemeral, which makes it easier for police to track calls to action and 
respond to them than it was in the days of pamphleteering.482 
One final point about the nature of social media is that it may be 
harder to disperse crowds when they have communication devices.  
Wasik points out that in the UK riots, the “mob” often physically split 
into smaller groups that remained connected via their Blackberries.483  
This concern should be addressed by Brandenburg, however.  If a crowd 
splits up and members continue to wander the area, but they message 
each other indicating that they should immediately meet again to 
conduct violence, that messaging in the heat of the moment might be 
properly regulated as incitement.  Otherwise, the problem of the “virtual 
mob” leads into tricky territory.  If physical masses are what contribute 
most to damaging crowd behavior, then it is not justifiable to regulate 
people as crowds or riots once they physically disperse. 
There are also features of online media that make them less 
threatening to government.  Molly Beutz Land, for example, notes an 
inverse relationship between broad mobilization and meaningful 
participation, arguing that as activist groups reach larger numbers 
online, the depth of the participation of each individual person drops.484  
This relationship happens in part because of the growth of size of the 
movements.  Political scientist Navid Hassanpour has observed that the 
relationship between social media and the Arab Spring in Egypt is 
complicated; people went outside to protest in part because the 
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government shut down the internet, not because somebody called for 
organization to occur.485  Malcolm Gladwell rather famously 
commented that the internet in fact lulls people into complacency rather 
than spurring them to action.486 
In conclusion, there are a number of features of new media that 
appear particularly worrisome to regulators.  These features can 
contribute to activism.487  They might also contribute to genocide.488  
However, these features should not inspire a change in the Brandenburg 
standard, as many of are the same issues that exist in other media such 
as print, radio, or television.  In the case of incitement to riot, there 
should be no change in Brandenburg to reflect the rise of flash mobs. 
IX. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN NEW MEDIA AND ASSEMBLY 
Assembly is one mode of participation in public culture.  Before the 
internet, when the primary means of accessing the public was top-down 
media such as newspapers or television, public assembly was one of the 
few ways individuals could participate in crafting public culture.  The 
internet is in some ways the virtual version of physical assembly.489  
Thus both in-person and online assembly are particularly important if 
the goal of the First Amendment is cultural democracy, regardless of the 
content of the assembly. 
X. MODEL LAW 
This paper closes by attempting to outline a constitutional and 
proportionate incitement-to-riot statute.  Under Brandenburg, the 
incitement portion of the statute must contain intent, imminence, 
likelihood, and an audience likely to understand the command.  I also 
incorporate lessons from more recent crowd psychology, suggesting as a 
matter of policy that the regulation should be of a larger group that is 
more likely to swarm.  Congress itself once proposed raising the number 
of people required for riot from three to five, though the bill did not 
 
 485. See Noam Cohen, In Unsettled Times, Media Can Be a Call to Action, or a Distraction, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/29/business/media/in-times-of-unrest-social-
networks-can-be-a-distraction.html. 
 486. Malcolm Gladwell, Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted, NEW YORKER, 
Oct. 4, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell. 
 487. See generally Buetz Land, supra note 484 (suggesting the benefits of online organization for 
activist efforts). 
 488. See Susan Benesch, Vile Crime or Inalienable Right: Defining Incitement to Genocide, 48 
VA. J. INT’L L. 485 (2008). 
 489. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
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pass.490 Below, I propose that a more reasonable base number might be 
fifteen.  The following language could constitute a model incitement to 
riot statute: 
A person is guilty of inciting to riot when he or she clearly and 
intentionally urges [15] or more people to imminently and collectively 
engage in force or violence that damages property or injures people, at a 
time and place and under circumstances where such force or violence is 
imminent and likely to occur. 
The act or conduct may not include the mere oral or written advocacy of 
ideas or expression of belief that does not urge the commission of an act 
of immediate violence. 
Alternatively, one could set up a statutory regime that redefines the 
underlying crime of riot.  Riot could be defined as a gathering of a 
certain number of people that, as common law required, involves the use 
of force or violence—not the mere threat or risk of force or violence.  
This underlying definition could require actual damage.  Riot and 
incitement to riot could thus alternatively be defined as follows: 
A person commits the crime of riot if, intentionally with [15] or more 
other persons, he or she engages in force and violence and thereby causes 
injury to persons or damage to property. 
A person commits the crime of incitement to riot when he or she clearly 
and intentionally urges [15] or more persons to immediately riot, at a time 
and place and under circumstances where such riot is imminent and likely 
to occur. 
XI. CONCLUSION 
Public gatherings can be highly threatening to governments, as seen 
over the past year.  They are also essential to democracy, legitimizing 
government by allowing direct public participation in policy making.  
Prohibiting public gatherings or a call to public gatherings can itself lead 
to revolution, as crowds legitimize their behavior by reacting to overly 
strong state authority.  Flash mobs and flash robs are new phenomena, 
but intellectuals’ understandings of mob action have influenced the 
development of First Amendment jurisprudence since its inception.  
This article calls for a reevaluation of our understanding of mobs, and 
awareness of the prejudices we operate under when writing legislation to 
control crowds. 
The United States is home to the most speech-protective law in the 
world.  As legislators and courts deal with the inevitable backlash to 
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flash mobs, they must reexamine existing incitement-to-riot statutes to 
ensure compliance with the First Amendment.  They must do so with the 
same understanding the Supreme Court had back in 1937: that it is 
imperative to “preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, 
free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free 
political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the 
will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by 
peaceful means.  Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very 
foundation of constitutional government.”491 
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